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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE PROBLEM
Transit organizations, both public and private, are under great internal and
external pressures today to improve their organizational effectiveness. Studies
have shown that the collective bargaining relationship between union and
management, particularly the collective bargaining agreement, has a direct,
measurable effect on organizational effectiveness. Both transit management
and transit unions have begun to recognize that it is in their mutual interest to
improve organizational effectiveness by turning toward a more cooperative
collective bargaining relationship. Yet there is a scarcity of information as to
why many of these experiments have failed. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no up-to-date labor relations guide that is transit specific and
emphasizes labor-management cooperative programs.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
This report is intended to be a practical guide for transit managers, supervisors,
union leaders, members of labor or management negotiating committees, joint
labor-management committees, and anyone else who is involved in labor
relations in the transit industry. This guide assumes that the reader has only
modest experience with collective bargaining negotiations, or none at all.
Readers who are experienced negotiators may wish to skip the section in this
report called “Some Negotiating Basics” as well as the section near the end of
this guide entitled “Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Terms.”
The information this report offers builds upon the studies of many individual
authors, reports of government task forces, and interviews with experienced
labor relations practitioners in transit. Major emphasis in this study is placed
on the newer approaches to transit labor relations, namely interest-based
bargaining and joint-labor management problem-solving committees.
What do we mean by transit? In trying to limit our investigation, we were
guided by the following definition by the Subcommittee on Definitions of the
Transit Research Board, which served us best in limiting the scope of our
research project:
transit, public (mass transit)-passenger transportation service,
usually local, that is available to any person who pays a prescribed
fare; it operates on established schedules along designated routes
with specific stops (e.g., bus, light rail, rapid transit).1
We have further limited our discussion to surface transit, omitting ocean and
air transportation of passengers. In addition, we decided to exclude
Executive Summary
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conventional railroads because they work under a different legal framework
and have a different type of labor relations system than transit organizations.
We have, however, included certain metropolitan commuter railroad
operations when it seemed relevant to the topic of labor-management
partnerships. We have also included some discussion of the devastating
Greyhound strikes, even though Greyhound Lines provides inter-city
passenger service and, strictly speaking, does not fit the definition of “transit”
we have given above. We have done so because of the profound impact the
Greyhound strikes had on local transit operations, particularly the major union
in the transit field––the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU).
This study utilized a wide variety of data collection techniques: literature
review, Internet searches, formal and informal face-to-face interviews,
telephone interviews, correspondence with knowledgeable authors and
practitioners, and information gathered at conferences. Since both authors are
also professional trainers for the National Transit Institute, they took advantage
of the opportunities in many of their training sessions to gather information
from transit practitioners participating in these training programs. Our
interview sample may be called a “convenience sample” of experts and
experienced practitioners.
TWO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEMS
In the last two decades, profound changes have taken place in this country in
the way unions and management deal with each other. The transit industry is
no exception, although the changes there have been considerably slower. In the
past, union and management in transit have negotiated their collective
bargaining agreements largely through adversarial, even hostile, bargaining,
sometimes called distributive bargaining or positional bargaining. They
competed with each other over how big a slice of a fixed-size economic pie, or
profits, each would get. They were willing to risk a strike or lockout, if
necessary.
A threat to the economic or political survival to both parties caused some of
them to re-evaluate their adversarial union-management relationship and try a
more cooperative approach to collective bargaining. They began what is
commonly called interest-based bargaining. Others maintained their
adversarial collective bargaining relationship.
1 Glossary of Urban Public Transportation Terms, Special Report 179, Subcommittee on
Definitions, Committee on Public Transportation, Transportation Research Board,
Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, National Research Council. Washington, DC:
National Academy of Sciences, 1978, p. 34
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Today both approaches co-exist, even though they seem to be diametrically
opposed to each other. Both seem to work, at least for the time being. As a
matter of fact, in some cases the same parties over time alternate between the
two approaches, but usually not without at least one of them perceiving
interest-based bargaining as a failure. In this study we have explored the
reasons for these failures, perceived or real, as well as some of the factors that
contributed to the success of the more cooperative approaches.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSIT LABOR RELATIONS
THE EARLIEST FORM OF TRANSIT: FERRY BOATS
The earliest form of transit in this country was ferryboats. Rivers were the
forerunners of today’s highways; however, they often presented formidable
obstacles for those traveling on foot or on horseback. In the past, these
travelers needed a ferryboat to get from one side of the river to the other
because large bridges did not yet exist.
We can say that the earliest ferrymen were Native American Indians. Records
show that they carried Spanish soldiers across the southern rivers as early as
1540.2 We do not know whether in those days they worked for some type of
compensation or not. Perhaps their only reward was that their lives were
spared. Much later, they carried western settlers and traders across the waters.
Still later, some of the settlers themselves became ferryboat operators. In those
days, before huge bridges were being built, ferries linked many of the colonial
settlements. Eventually, ferryboat operators started to work for wages, and
later formed unions. Unfortunately, we do not know when they started to
unionize. Early historians and economists had little interest in labor history and
left us no records. We do know, however, that there already existed a fairly
sizable union of ferryboat operators in California around the turn of the
century. It was an independent union that called itself the Ferryboatsmen’s
Union. In the early 1920s it became the first San Francisco Bay Area union to
admit members of all races to its ranks. It later became the Inlandboatmen’s
Union of the Pacific (IBU). In the 1940s, the IBU became affiliated with the
Seafarers International Union (SIU), an action it came to regret, for the SIU
infringed upon the autonomy the IBU was used to and often undermined its
traditional occupational and geographic jurisdictions. In the 1970s, IBU
members overwhelmingly voted to break the union’s affiliation with the SIU.
In order to enhance its economic and political power, the IBU affiliated in
1980 with the International Longshoremen Association, known for its militant
unionism and political activism.
The reader may wonder where the term “longshoremen” comes from. In the
old days, when cargo ships needed to be loaded or unloaded, labor was often
simply recruited at the last minute on the shoreside by having a crier yell,
“Men along the shore!” and hire the men needed to load or unload a ship on the
spot. The union later changed its name to International Longshore and
Warehouse Union (ILWU).
2 John Perry, American Ferryboats. New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1957, p. 3.
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Early ferryboat operators, as well as longshoremen, were forced to work under
miserable conditions: wage cuts, kickbacks, speedups, blacklists, and other
union-busting practices by employers. In 1980, about 700 members of the
Inlandboatsmen’s Union (IBU) went on strike against the Washington State
Ferry System. When the strike leaders were jailed, the ILWU came to their
rescue by having their locals shut down the Puget Sounds ports for 24 hours on
April 15, 1980. The work stoppage led to serious collective bargaining
between the State Ferry System and the IBU, and the union won considerable
improvements in working conditions. After the strike, the IBU decided to
affiliate with ILWU, which had helped it win the strike. It has apparently been
a very successful affiliation because the ILWU allowed the IBU considerable
autonomy; the IBU won more strikes, increased its membership, and even
participated in the ILWU’s political activities. Today the Marine Division of
the ILWU represents a large number of ferryboat operators.3
THE HORSE-DRAWN TRANSIT VEHICLE ERA
Transit, as we know the term today, did not really begin until the 19th century
when the distances between home and work in the larger cities had become too
large to walk on foot. Horse-pulled stagecoaches were introduced and were
used by those who could afford them. This form of passenger transportation
was first introduced on a large scale on the streets of New York City in 1827. It
quickly grew in popularity, and by 1835 over a hundred such “omnibuses” ran
in New York City.
By 1885, close to 600 horse-drawn omnibuses ran over 26 fixed routes in the
city, and actually started to cause the first urban traffic congestion.4 Later,
these horse-pulled stagecoaches were put on special wheels that ran on railroad
tracks because there were no paved, or only poorly paved streets in those days.
The earlier chroniclers of the labor movement claimed that the horses that
pulled the streetcars were treated better than the drivers, who were on duty
from the early morning hours until the horses were returned to the barn late at
night. These drivers, more often than not, put in an 18-hour workday. The
horses, on the other hand, worked only a four-hour day or less. It cost more
money to replace a horse than a worker in those days.
Transit workers could be required to work as many as 20 hours a day for the
3
“The ILWU Story: Six Decades of Militant Unionism,” (online), http://www.ilwu.com/
tis.htm, pp. 1, 16-17.
4 Charles Luna, The UTU Handbook of Transportation in America. New York: Popular
Library, 1971, p. 14.
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same daily wage, without any additional compensation for the extra time
worked. Transit workers had no benefits and no job security. They had no
holidays, no vacations, no pension, and no health care. Absence from work, no
matter what the reason, would often cost transit workers their jobs.
Dissatisfied with their working conditions, the early streetcar workers formed
the first known labor union in the transit industry in this country. A driver on
New York’s Third Avenue Line by the name of John Walker is credited by
labor historians as being the leader behind the formation of this union,
regarded to be the forerunner of what is now known as the Amalgamated
Transit Union (ATU). His success was short-lived. Powerful opposition by the
streetcar company, and the outbreak of the Civil War, caused the union to
falter. Attempts more than 20 years later to revive this and other transit unions
did not fare much better. It was not until December 1885 that a rebuilt union
proposed a labor contract to the management of the Third Avenue Line that
was accepted. Soon after, the union also presented a list of grievances to the
management of the Sixth Avenue Railway only to have it ignored for three
weeks. When after three weeks the workers went on strike, the company
signed a contract only five hours later. More union organizing and negotiating
successes in New York City followed––first with the smaller, then with the
larger companies. Word of the labor union’s success spread throughout the
country, and transit employees all over the U.S. joined organized labor’s push
to end the 18-hour workday and demanded an 8-hour workday. They
eventually managed to get the 12-hour workday. Much to the dismay of many
union leaders, many transit workers thought they had achieved their purpose
and left their transit unions, leaving them once again powerless.5
In 1892, Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), the historic statesman of American labor, called a national convention
of unionized transit workers in this country. The 50 representatives of 22 local
unions from all over the United States formed the first nation-wide union of
transit workers. They called it the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway
Employees of America. Shortly afterwards, the name was changed to
Amalgamated Association of Street, Railway, and Motor Coach Employees of
America. In 1963, it was decided to shorten the name to Amalgamated Transit
Union. 6
5 Amalgamated Transit Union Staff, A History of the Amalgamated Transit Union.
Washington, DC: Amalgamated Transit Union, 1992, pp. 3-5.
6 Darold T. Barnum, From Private to Public: Labor Relations in Urban Mass Transit.
Bloomington, Indiana: Institute for Urban Transportation, Indians University, 1977, chapter 2.
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THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
Horse-drawn streetcars were followed by steam railroads and electric cable
cars running on rails as technology developed. It was not until the 1910-1920
decade that improved street pavement and the emergence of internal
combustion engines led to the introduction of bus traffic in the larger cities.7
With few exceptions, by 1939 most city transportation systems had been
replaced by buses. In those days, most public transit services were provided by
private firms operating for profit. During World War II, privately owned
municipal transit systems grew because of the needs of the war industry and
the shortage of fuel and rubber needed for the war effort. After World War II,
highway expansion and increased availability of private automobiles led to a
fast decline of public mass transportation throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Low ridership led to widespread financial crises for the private transit
companies, and to wage cuts and layoffs all over the country. In many places
bus drivers and maintenance workers struck in protest of the wage cuts.
Finally, the continuing financial crises forced most private transit companies
out of business.
After 1964 many transit unions, particularly the ATU, started to join forces
with the local business community and local politicians to influence state
legislators to pass “enabling legislation,” which created public transit systems.
The passing of this type of state legislation generally provided state funding for
the establishment and operation of these public transit systems. Often these
state funding sources were supplemented or replaced by local tax funding
sources. In addition to providing funds for publicly owned transit operations,
this type of enabling state legislation also created public transit authorities to
govern the public transit organizations, and generally set forth a number of
collective bargaining protections for union members.8
By the 1970s, most public transit in the United States had become government-
owned, but not without massive financial assistance from the federal
government. That assistance did not come without strings attached. To be
eligible for federal funds transit entities had to adhere to numerous conditions,
requirements, and regulations. The federal government exercised enormous
influence on transit operations.9 The Amalgamated Transit Unit grew rapidly
in membership as a result of the passage of the 1964 Urban Mass
7 American Public Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, 50th edition, Washington, DC:
APTA, 1999, pp.151-156.
8 Fernando E. Gapasin, Union Organization and Changing Demographics, unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1994, chapter 3.
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Transportation Act (UMTA) discussed in the chapter on the Legal
Environment of Transit Labor Relations. The UMTA literally saved public
mass transportation and with it boosted the strength of transit unions. The ATU
and other transit unions had lobbied Congress aggressively to make sure that
transit workers of private transit companies who became public employees of
federally funded public transit authorities suffered no loss of collective
bargaining rights in the takeover. These protections were in Section 13(c) of
the UMTA of 1964, indeed a landmark in legal protections of unions and their
members. These 13c protections, coupled with the enabling state legislation
previously mentioned, greatly enhanced the power of transit unions by
preserving all of the private sector union rights contained in the National Labor
Relations Act protections as their members moved from private sector to
public sector employee status. Following the passage of the UMTA, even the
most conservative states, which had previously outlawed public sector
collective bargaining, quickly changed whatever legislation needed to be
changed to qualify for federal funding under the UMTA. Between 1964 and
1974, 40 states passed legislation creating public transit authorities, and most
of them made sure that there was no interference in their transit legislation with
13c protections of the UMTA. When revised versions of the UMTA were
passed by Congress between 1974 and 1991, the old collective bargaining
protections, and with it the power of transit unions, were preserved.
THE GREAT GREYHOUND STRIKES
Although Greyhound passenger service is inter-city in nature, and therefore
does not fit our strict definition of “transit,” we believe a discussion of two
large strikes at Greyhound are relevant to labor management relations across
the transportation industry. They made history in the entire transportation
industry. They had profound impact on local transit operations as well,
particularly the major union in the transit field, the Amalgamated Transit
Union (ATU). They helped shape the future relationship between the ATU and
transit facilities. They gave the national leadership of the ATU a powerful
reason to champion interest-based bargaining in the transit industry, which was
ready for a change.
A seven-week strike occurred at Greyhound in 1983. Another one started in
1990 and ended more than three years later. Both made history. Both had
devastating consequences, for both the union and the company. Greyhound
9 Mass Transit Management: A Handbook for Small Cities, 3rd edition revised, Part I: Goals,
Support, and Finance, Final Report February 1988. Bloomington, Indiana, Institute for Urban
Transportation at Indiana University, Center for Transit Research and Management
Development, p. 45.
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Bus Lines had experienced strikes before 1983, but they were generally only
local strikes with relatively modest impact on the company's labor relations
and its financial health. Generally speaking, the relationship between company
and union had been good, and both sides had prospered. All that changed
dramatically in November of 1983, when contract negotiations between the
company and the ATU broke down and a bitter, highly publicized nationwide
strike erupted. It was a strike marked by physical violence between striking
employees and the company's newly hired striker replacements. It was a seven-
week long strike that the ATU could not win. Some 12,700 ATU members
walked off the job. Many of them regretted it, especially as Christmas drew
closer and closer.
Before 1982, Greyhound was a prosperous company that prided itself on
paying the highest wages in the industry. Greyhound all but ignored its
competition, including a company named Trailways, its main competitor,
which paid considerably lower wage rates than Greyhound. Considering
Trailways’ frail financial situation and the prospect of losing union members'
jobs, the ATU agreed in early 1982 to a wage freeze at Trailways. Lower
wages enabled Trailways to launch a major price war against Greyhound, well
publicizing its lower bus fares.
At first Greyhound ignored Trailways’ discounted fares and price war
publicity. During spring of 1983, however, Greyhound began to experience a
sharp decline in ridership. Passengers had become more price conscious. As a
result, Greyhound had no choice but to drop its fares. Deregulation of the
transportation industry made the competition for passengers even stiffer. New
entrepreneurs who paid low wages entered the business and offered fare prices
much lower than the more established inter-city lines.
The newly deregulated airline industry made things even worse for
Greyhound. Low-cost passenger airline carriers sprang up after deregulation of
the industry and gave intercity bus lines a run for their money. People Express,
for example, charged only $23 for a flight between New York City and
Buffalo. Greyhound charged $41 for the trip. A flight by Southwest Airlines
from San Francisco to Phoenix was only $60, compared to a Greyhound's bus
ticket to the same location costing $79. By the middle of 1983, Greyhound
showed an operating loss of $18 million. Greyhound's operating costs were 30
to 50 percent higher than that of other major bus lines. The company was
paying about $62 million a year more for salary and benefits of its nearly 7,500
bus drivers than other bus companies. The difference in wage and benefit cost
for mechanics, service personnel and office employees between Greyhound
and its competitors showed a similar disparity.10 No wonder during the 1983
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contract negotiations with the ATU, Greyhound insisted on a 9.5 percent wage
cut. Union leaders and union members were outraged, and a bitter strike
ensued. Unfortunately for the union, it came during a period of high
nationwide unemployment and only weeks before Christmas.
The company was ready. It had already recruited more than 1,300 new hires in
anticipation of the strike. Many of them were experienced drivers of other bus
companies. The company announced that it would replace all striking
employees with new hires at the lower, prevailing industry wage rate. The
company gave its all in resisting the strike and kept the buses rolling. It trained
new drivers, sent hundreds of executives to do field work, video taped acts of
violence on the picket line, and did everything in its power to fight the union in
the courts. Still, replacing the entire workforce on strike was costly and time
consuming. Both sides felt the economic pressure. Greyhound had to cut back
on its passenger service. The company had lost much business, and the union
many jobs.
In an attempt to get striking employees to return to work, Greyhound lowered
its proposed pay cut to 7.8 percent. The union leaders submitted the offer to a
vote of its 12,000 members but recommended strongly against it. As one might
expect, the overwhelming majority of those voting rejected the offer. Federal
mediators entered the picture. They eventually managed to broker a tentative
agreement on December 2, 1983. The union agreed to send the last offer of the
company, including the 7.8 percent wage cut, to the homes of its members for a
vote, to be returned by mail. The vote count on December 19, 1983, showed
that this time an overwhelming majority of striking employees decided to
return to work. A painful seven-week strike had come to an end just a few days
before Christmas. But the ATU had suffered a major defeat that would haunt it
for years to come. It had to settle for the same 7.8 percent wage cut the
company had insisted on way back in November. In addition, the union had to
swallow a cut in pay from ten to eight percent per year; a four percent cut in
pension benefits, and a two-tier pay schedule that paid new hires 20-25 percent
less than employees under the old contract.11 Greyhound, on the other hand,
boasted that it had gained the wage parity it had been seeking, yet at the same
time paid the highest wages in the industry. At that time, labor costs amounted
to about 62 percent of total operating costs. The union's concessions had
10Oscar Schillgall, The Greyhound Story. Chicago: J. G Ferguson Publishing Co., 1985, pp.
293-300.
11 Ronald J. Peters, The Greyhound Story: Rebuilding a Relationship Through a Joint Training
Process, Paper presented at the National Labor Management Conference, May 29-31, 1996,
Chicago, Illinois, pp. 2-5
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brought the company about an eight- percent reduction in bus line operating
expenses over the life of the new three-year contract.12
The company's victorious feelings were short-lived. Economic pressures kept
increasing. The deterioration of economic conditions in the inter-city bus
industry in general continued to get worse, and with it the strength of the ATU
deteriorated further. In 1984 Greyhound laid off about 1,500 employees,
including 400 supervisors, and in 1985 sold 120 bus terminals, terminating
2,000 more employees, and franchised many routes to lower-cost bus
companies. Amongst economic chaos, in 1987 a group of Greyhound
investors, led by Fred Currey, acquired Trailways, Greyhound's major
competitor, in a leveraged buyout. Approximately 1,400 Trailways bus drivers
were absorbed into ATU bargaining unit at Greyhound. Greyhound gave them
full seniority for their years at Trailways. In the contract negotiations that
followed, ATU members suffered further wage cuts, even greater than before.
In addition, they had to agree to another two-tier pay schedule, under which
new hires would be making even less than they did already.13
By the time the next contract negotiation between the ATU and Greyhound
Lines came around in 1989, the company's profits had improved, although it
still had a large debt burden. With the news of improved profits in 1989 came
employee expectations of higher pay. The company strenuously resisted union
demands for a wage increase citing its heavy debt burden, claiming that its
profit in 1989 was modest, and that it had incurred losses amounting to $20
million the previous two years. In addition, the company emphasized its need
to keep its labor cost down because of the heavy competition from railroads
and airlines.14 The union claimed that the company had understated its profits,
and that its heavy debts were due to poor management. The acquisition of
Trailways alone had increased Greyhound's debt by $80 million, bringing the
company's total long-term indebtedness to $300 million. Given its increased
profits in 1989, the ATU claimed that the company could afford higher
wages.15 Yet by June 1990, Greyhound had declared bankruptcy.
By the time the collective bargaining agreement had expired on March 2, 1990,
the parties were still hopelessly deadlocked. Greyhound management refused
12
"If Anyone Won the Strike, Greyhound Did," Business Week, December 1983, pp. 39-40.
13 A History of the Amalgamated Transit Union. (Washington, DC: Amalgamated Transit
Union, 1992, pp. 146-147.
14 Peters (1996), p. 6.
15 A History of the Amalgamated Transit Union, (1992), pp. 147-148.
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to extend the current contract, and a bitter strike ensued. It was the most violent
strike the industry had ever seen, marred by dozens of shootings, over 100
bomb threats, and even one striker being killed by a bus driven by a striker
replacement. Close to 9,000 Greyhound employees were out of work, and the
company once again hired a large number of striker replacements. The ATU
claimed, with a good deal of justification, that Greyhound was out to bust the
union. Greyhound CEO Fred Currey certainly was no friend of organized
labor. The ATU filed unfair labor practices charges with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), which were later upheld. The ATU pointed out that
Greyhound had already advertised that it was hiring permanent striker
replacements while it was still in negotiations with the union, and had already
hired and trained hundreds of non-union strike breakers well before the strike
began.
As the strike progressed Greyhound continued operations, using more than
2,450 strike-breakers. The union successfully enlisted public and government
support by pointing out that striker replacements were poorly trained and
presented a danger to public safety. It also publicized injuries of strikers on the
picket line and blamed the company for inciting the violence.16
Union attempts to get legislation passed to make the hiring of strike-breakers
illegal were unsuccessful. Both the union and the company, however, filed a
large number of unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, and even
initiated lawsuits in the courts. They accused each other of inciting violence on
the picket lines and illegal collective bargaining practices. One of the most
shocking examples of strike violence occurred in Redding, California, when a
striking ATU member was killed by a Greyhound bus driven by a newly hired
strike-breaker. In March 1990, Greyhound broke off further negotiations. As
time went on, and no end seemed to be in sight, the strikers became more and
more weary. The picket lines at Greyhound bus terminals around the country
grew thinner and thinner. Drivers started to cross the very picket lines they had
staffed earlier. In 1993, near the second anniversary of the strike, when about
1,500 striking employees had already returned to work, the ATU capitulated
and told its members that they were free to return to work.17
LESSONS LEARNED
Did Greyhound "win" the strike? Certainly not. Both sides had lost, and lost
badly. Before the 1990 strike, Greyhound had employed 6,300 drivers. When
16 A History of the Amalgamated Transit Union, pp. 148-149. See also Janice Castro, "Labor
Draws An Empty Gun," TIME, March 26, 1990, pp. 56-59.
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"Business Briefs," Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1993, page B3.
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the dispute ended, there were only 3,300.18 The ATU suffered devastating
losses in membership. The company was already bankrupt by the middle of
1990. CEO Fred Currey lost his job, and he was replaced by Frank Schmieder,
who had a reputation of being less hostile to unions than his predecessor. The
company lost its appeals to the NLRB. Both sides had filed over a hundred
charges, claiming unfair labor practices by the other during the strike. On the
major issues, the NLRB ruled in favor of the union. It decided that the strike
had been caused and delayed by the illegal practices of the company––
practices that included bargaining in bad faith, illegally giving striker
replacements seniority over striking drivers, making unlawful bargaining
proposals, interfering with employees' rights to engage in lawful union
activities, and unlawfully discharging over 200 striking drivers nationwide.
But the union lost also. Although the NLRB awarded $22 million in back pay
to ATU employees, the bankruptcy courts severely limited the back pay to
which striking workers were entitled.19 The NLRB rulings, and a more
conciliatory attitude of the new Greyhound CEO Frank Schmieder, however,
led to renewed contract negotiations between the ATU and Greyhound. This
resulted in an agreement reached in April 1993, more than three years after the
previous contract had expired. The ATU had reestablished its right to represent
Greyhound workers, but Greyhound gained the right to retain the replacement
workers it had hired during the strike. The ATU won the recall of 550 drivers
still on strike and the reinstatement of workers the company had fired for
violence related incidents. The contract, which the ATU membership ratified
in May 1993, called for a 20 percent wage increase for employees over the life
of the six-year contract, in addition to the $22 million in back pay to eligible
strikers which the NLRB had previously awarded the union.20
It is difficult to overestimate the impact these two Greyhound strikes had on
labor relations in the entire transportation industry, including transit. The
realization that strikes of this magnitude could ruin both union and company
brought about a greater willingness on both sides to engage in interest-based
bargaining and other forms of union-management cooperation. We have
encountered union leaders in transit facilities who used to work for Greyhound
18 Peters (1996), p. 5.
19 Michael H.Cimini, Susan L. Behrmann, and Eric M. Johnson, "Labor-Management
Bargaining in 1992, Monthly Labor Review, January 1993, pp. 19, 29-30.
20 Michael H.Cimini, Susan L. Behrmann, and Eric M. Johnson, "Labor-Management
Bargaining in 1993," Monthly Labor Review, January 1994, pp. 29-30. See also "Business
Briefs," Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1993, page B3. See also Peters, The Greyhound Story.
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and who still remember the hardships the Greyhound strike brought to striking
drivers and mechanics. Said one interviewee, the chair of the union negotiating
committee at a transit facility:
When the company and the national VP of the ATU suggested that
we try interest-based bargaining here at this transit facility, I was
ready. I have been through three strikes in 10 years, including the
big one at Greyhound. I am a middle-aged woman, a single parent. I
knew I couldn’t afford another strike…Nobody ever wins in a strike,
even if you get what you want. By the time the strike gets settled, for
the most part you have lost a lot, and it takes years to recoup it. As
far as I was concerned, strike was not an option…there had to be a
better way…The others [who once worked at Greyhound] felt the
same way.21
The losses suffered during the Greyhound strikes also caused the national
leadership of the ATU to re-evaluate its bargaining relationship with transit
companies. Jim LaSala, president of the ATU, became a champion of interest-
based bargaining. Terry Van der AA, founder of and CEO of Vancom
Transportation, which owns a number of transit companies in this country,
spoke of a meeting he had with Jim LaSala in Washington in 1993:
I have to give Jim LaSala credit. He had just been through the
Greyhound strike for three years. ATU had lost two-thirds of its
membership, and the strike almost ruined Greyhound. When I was
in his office in Washington, he said that the ex CEO of Greyhound
had sat in the same chair I was sitting in and had told him the same
thing that I was telling him about working together. LaSala said: “I
should have listened.” He now recognized, because of the
Greyhound strike, that whoever ATU’s employees worked for had
to be successful, or else ATU was not successful. The Greyhound
contract now has some elements of participation in it, and LaSala
was introduced to those by Greyhound. When the whole thing was
settled, Secretary of Labor Reich was at the final signing of the
contract and gave both sides accolades for reinventing, if you will,
labor relationships. It’s possible that LaSala liked that sense of being
a pioneer. 22
21 Interview at a transit facility with chair of union negotiating committee, who wanted to
remain anonymous, April 28, 1995.
22 Louis B. Barnes, Vancom Transportation (A), Harvard Business School Case N9-494-127,
April 13, 1994, pp. 8-9.
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There are lessons to be learned by transit management and transit unions, not
only from the Greyhound strikes, but strikes in the airline industry as well––
particularly those experienced by Eastern Airlines. Kenneth Jennings,
distinguished labor relations scholar, has noted that Eastern Airlines failed to
learn from the Greyhound experience, and as a result, suffered the same fate.
According to Jennings, there are several lessons we need to learn from the
Eastern Airline and Greyhound experiences, lessons that apply to the entire
transportation industry:
• Destructive labor relations have adverse effects on a company's financial
and marketing position, which can only be reversed by the parties
themselves, not by government intervention.
• Management must be proactive in its dealings with union officials if it
wants to reverse hostile labor relations. It cannot wait for the union to make
the first move toward a more conciliatory approach.
• Striker replacement policy creates horrendous legal problems, and legal
problems have a habit of dragging on and on.
A weak and fragmented union typically offers more disadvantages than
advantages for management. A weak union cannot facilitate the collective
bargaining process because union officers, when faced with this situation,
typically spend most of their time and energies quelling political rivals and
appeasing the various factions within the union, and while negotiating,
management cannot be sure that union negotiators really speak for the union
membership. Agreements reached with union leaders at the bargaining table
will easily unravel when a competing faction within the union convinces the
membership that the proposals are not in their best interests. 23
As we shall see in our discussion on examples of cooperative relationships
between unions and management in the transit industry, such relationships tend
to avoid the above pitfalls.
23 Kenneth M. Jennings, "Eastern's Final Days: Labor Relations Lessons for Managers in other
Organizations, Transportation Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 33-36.
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THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF
TRANSIT LABOR RELATIONS
SOME ECONOMIC REALITIES
Labor relations in the transit industry are shaped by both economic and
political realities. They are realities that may be unique to the entire transit
industry or only to certain districts. Nevertheless, they govern the behavior of
union and management representatives at the bargaining table and in their day-
to-day relationships.
The transit industry is a highly labor intensive industry. About 80 percent of
transit operating cost is labor cost. Yet fare box collections cover only about 50
percent of operating cost. It is extremely difficult to render almost any kind of
mass transportation service as a profit-making enterprise in the United States
today. Both operating cost and capital improvements require public funds. In
addition to fare box revenues, funds to operate a public transit system will most
likely come from a variety of other sources, such as sales taxes, property taxes,
and government subsidies. The justification for supporting transit with public
funds is that transit benefits not only the passengers but also the community as
a whole. Real estate developers, for example, benefit from having transit
services provide access to their developments, retail merchants benefit from
having access provided to their sales outlets, residents of high density areas
benefit from a reduction of automobile congestion, and employers may need
smaller size parking lots because of employee access to their work places by
public transit. 24
Most states provide aid for mass transit either in the form of direct contribution
to the transit facility or as a budget allocation that is part of “enabling
legislation.” This means that state legislation, which creates local transit
authorities also sets forth their powers and conditions to which transit authority
policies must conform. Such state legislation is almost always drafted in such a
way that it enables local transit authorities to qualify for federal funding.
Typically the amount of state funding that is granted depends on the
percentage of the cost that local transit authorities must bear of the cost for
federally supported capital improvements.25 Local government subsidies for
24 Institute of for Urban Transportation at Indiana University, Mass Transit Management: A
Handbook for Small Cities, 3rd edition revised February 1988, Part 1: Goals, Support, and
Finance. Washington, DC: Urban Mass Transportation Agency, US Department of
Transportation, 1988, p. 59.
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transit operations may come from local sales tax or allocations from municipal
and county governments. All of this external funding is in the interest of both
transit management and transit unions. It is in the interest of local transit
management to seek close cooperation with its unions in trying to influence
state legislators, state and federal regulators, local politicians, as well as
taxpayers to support their requests for funding, favorable legislation and
favorable interpretation of rules and regulations. In modern labor relations, an
important role of unions is to help the employer enhance its ability to pay for
wage and benefit increases for its membership. A financially healthy employer
is needed to assure income and job security for union members.
THE RATIONAL COMMUTER
In transit organizations, whether private or public, labor relations are heavily
influenced by how well the transit facility is doing financially. The employer’s
ability to pay for wage and benefit increases is heavily influenced by ridership.
Transit planners and policy makers often assume that the modern urban
AmericanS should gladly use mass transit transportation to and from work.
They claim it is cheaper, more convenient, and reduces the overcrowding of
highways and city streets. They rack their brains over how they might entice
commuters to go to and from work by bus or light rail, rather than in their own
automobile.
Yet commuters are consistently rational in the mode of transportation they
choose. What matters most to them is convenience and price.26 It is quite
rational for people with reasonable incomes to travel to and from work by car,
rather than subject themselves to the discomfort and inconveniences of
standing in line at bus or rail stops, standing up like cattle in crowded transit
vehicles with poor heating or air conditioning, and taking twice as long to get
to work or home than in their automobile. Indeed, they are quite willing to pay
for the difference in comfort and convenience. In fact, only lack of parking
space, exorbitant parking fees and unbearable traffic congestion are likely to
make them change their commuting habits.
Transit organizations, on the other hand are under great political pressure to
keep fares low. Without new sources of revenue, they find it difficult to
improve the comfort and convenience of transit commuter travel. As we shall
see in the chapter on labor-management partnerships, jointly administered
employee participation programs can do a lot to solve the dilemma, and to find
25 Institute of for Urban Transportation at Indiana University, 1988, Part 1, p. 64.
26 Thomas E. Lisco,” The Problems of Transit Systems,” in Diana Reische (ed), Problems of
Mass Transportation, New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1970, pp.47-57.
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creative ways to make it more attractive for commuters to travel in transit
vehicles, without charging exorbitant fares. But it takes an innovative spirit on
both sides, great patience, and persistence to be successful. These efforts
require changes in the organizational culture of both management and union.
Air pollution has become a major crisis in many of our cities and the nation in
general. It is here that transit organizations and their unions can make a
difference. The personal automobile is a far greater contributor to air pollution
than mass transit vehicles. Buses and light rail vehicles contribute only a very
small fraction to total city air pollution compared to the personal automobile
for the same passenger volume. By the same token, during peak traffic hours
the fuel consumption of transit buses and rapid rail vehicles per passenger mile
is far, far less than that of personal automobile consumption.27
We all know that, but tend to do little about it. Transit unions and management
can work together for mutual gain in this area in appealing to legislators, local
politicians and community groups to lend financial support to transit
organizations to upgrade transit vehicles and service in order to make transit
more attractive to commuters, increase ridership and to reduce air pollution
and fuel consumption.
NEGOTIATED INCENTIVES
In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that both transit unions and
transit management must play a greater role in helping their transit
organization remain economically competitive. For that reason, it has become
more common to negotiate employee incentive plans into the collective
bargaining agreement. Most of these reward employees for good attendance, a
crucial element in a transit organization’s overall performance. In addition,
these kinds of performance incentive plans have found their way to the
bargaining table: 28
• Bonuses rewarding on-time performance.
• Bonuses rewarding accident-free driving.
• Hourly wage increases based on meeting ridership goals
• Wages for service workers based on number of buses cleaned and fueled.
• Mechanic’s wages or bonuses based on percentage of vehicle fleet
27 American Public Transit Association (1999), pp. 20-24.
28 Institute of for Urban Transportation at Indiana University, 1988, Part 3: Operations, p. 198-
199.
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available for service.
• Drivers’ wages or bonuses related to fare box recovery ratio.
These incentives, designed to enhance the competitiveness of transit
employers, are usually “mandatory subjects” of collective bargaining. This
means that the law requires that if one side wants to negotiate the issue, the
other must demonstrate a willingness to do so. The legal obligation to
negotiate, of course, does not mean there is a legal obligation to agree.
PART-TIME LABOR
Transit unions have traditionally opposed the use of part-time transit vehicle
operators. They have tended to view part-time labor as a threat to their
members’ job security and hard-won collective bargaining gains, particularly
overtime pay, holiday pay and other fringe benefits. Transit organizations, on
the other hand, have sought to meet peak time staffing needs, internal and
external pressures for productivity improvements, and labor cost reductions by
employing part-time operators.
The typical transit organization has about twice as many vehicles running
during commuter peak hours as during the rest of the day. As a result, transit
agencies have fought bitter fights at the bargaining table to get unions to agree
to the use of part-time operators to deal with these staffing and payroll
problems. Since the use of part-time labor directly affects the working
conditions of union members who hold the same jobs, the part-time staffing of
operators’ jobs is a “mandatory subject of bargaining.” As we have said before,
mandatory subjects of bargaining are those issues which, by law, must be
negotiated if either side insists on it. In other words, neither side can refuse to
negotiate over it if the other side brings it up. The legal obligation to negotiate,
of course, does not mean that there is an obligation to agree. And indeed it has
not been easy in past decades for transit unions and transit management to
agree on the part-time labor issue. Strikes have occurred, and transit agencies
have often made heavy concessions during contract negotiations to get unions
to agree to the use of part-time operators. As a result, since the early 1980s,
contract provisions allowing the use of part-time transit vehicle operators have
become practically universal.29
For example, the collective bargaining agreement between ATU Local 1309
and the San Diego Transit Corporation covers part-time drivers, and contains
29 Kenneth M. Chomitz, Fiscal and Organizational Impact of Part-Time Labor in Public
Transit, Washington, DC: Urban Mass Transit Administration and US Department of
Commerce, 1985, p. xi.
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specific, elaborate provisions for them. It defines “part-time driver” as
someone who drives no more than 30 hours per week. The same union-
management contract also limits the hiring of part-time drivers to no more than
15 percent of full-time operators and only if there are at least 425 full-time
operators employed. The agreement also specifies the conditions under which
a part-time driver must be given an opportunity to advance to full-time status.
Part-time drivers may not work more than 6 hours a day, and have to be paid
the same hourly rate as full-time operators, but are not eligible for overtime or
holiday premium pay. Nor are they eligible to accrue such fringe benefits as
vacation, sick leave, death benefit, holidays, pension, or health benefits. When
part-time drivers become full-time employees, they receive proportionate
credit for their part-time employment toward wage progression and seniority.
No full-time operator can be laid off while part-time drivers are still employed.
At the close of each pay period, the company must furnish the union with an
accounting of hours worked by each part-time employee.30
We can see in this example, and many others that could be cited, that whatever
productivity improvements have come from the use of part-time operators
have come largely from a decrease in fringe benefit cost, not direct wages.
Part-time operators generally receive fewer fringe benefits than full-time
operators do. There is also some evidence that part-time operators have less
absenteeism and lower accident rates. According to one reputable study,
however, it is questionable that, when all things are considered, transit
organizations save more money by the use of part-time operators than they
give away to the union in concessions at the bargaining table. The benefit of
the use of part-time operators comes more from greater efficiencies in
scheduling, greater customer satisfaction and lower absenteeism than lower
wages and lower fringe benefit costs.31 As a matter of fact, most transit unions
will oppose a two-tier wage system: one pay rate for full-timers and a lower
one for part-timers. Whatever labor cost savings there are may come from
paying little or nothing for benefits for part-timers. Transit unions that
vigorously oppose a two-tier wage system sometimes create one by ignoring
the benefit “tier.” One transit labor professional said:
I have seen unions say no to two-tiered wage agreements, and the
same union will negotiate a clause for part-timers working 35 hours
a week without benefits–which turns out to be a two-tiered wage
30 Agreement Between San Diego AFL-CIO Bus Drivers Local 1309 of the Amalgamated
Transit Union and San Diego Transit, Section 21
31 Chomitz (1985), p. xv.
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structure.32
The use of part-timers in transit operations continues to be a controversial
issue. No doubt, we will see some changes in the benefit packages for part-
timers in the future, most likely toward more, rather than less, benefits.
PRIVITIZATION
Privatization and outsourcing (subcontracting) of certain public transit services
traditionally rendered by state and local governments have been in vogue for a
number of decades. Privatization refers to the transfer of an entire organization
into private individual or corporate ownership. “Subcontracting” or
“outsourcing” is usually more limited in scope and refers to public agencies
subcontracting only certain jobs or services to private sub-contractors, but
retaining tight controls as primary contractors over the way these services are
performed. Discussions over the topic of privatization sometimes become
confusing because writers do not always distinguish between privatization of
the entire transit property and subcontracting only certain parts of its
operation.33
The debates over privatization and subcontracting of transit services have been
going on for decades, and volumes have been written on the subject. Unions
have been very active participants in this debate, and rightfully so. Obviously,
privatization and subcontracting deeply affect union members’ job security,
working conditions, and collective bargaining rights. Many writers would have
us believe that there is a very strong trend toward privatization of transit
services. The evidence is mixed. According to an elite task force appointed by
the U.S. Department of Labor, the trend toward privatization of government
services has been exaggerated. According to that task force, the increase in
subcontracting by public agencies to private contractors is far less dramatic
than popular reporting suggests. New subcontracting is actually quite limited
and normally restricted to only a few services, and usually affects relatively
few employees. Furthermore, contrary to popular opinion, the cost of
providing public services through private enterprises is not necessarily lower
than providing the same services by a government agency. Some projected
costs actually represent merely cost shifting from one budget to another, or
32 E-mail communication with Frank Shipman, Vice President of Human Resources &
Employee Relations, San Diego Transit Corporation, February 24, 2000.
33 For a rigorous discussion of the various forms of outsourcing in the transit industry see
Darold T. Barnum, “Institutional Requirements for Competition: Labor Issues.” Transit
Administration and Planning Research. Transportation Research Record 1209. Washington,
DC: Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 1989, pp.40-48.
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present budget to future budget. For example, a payroll saving in one
jurisdiction may actually show up as added health and welfare costs in
someone else’s budget. Real cost savings depend largely on managerial
leadership and imagination of employees, and union officials, no matter
whether they are in a private or government organization.34
One reason that contracting out of public agency services is not as widespread
as often assumed is that the process is not as easy as it appears. Developing
effective bidding procedures, evaluating the bids, monitoring the contracts, and
measuring the performance of contractors is far more complicated than meets
the eye. The study results of the task force appointed by the U.S. Department
of Labor suggest that there is generally a lack of adequate data to measure cost
and quality in order to determine whether contracting out was an improvement
or not. Most public jurisdictions do not collect the kind of financial data
needed to allow those comparisons. It is a mistake to assume that wage and
benefit levels differ drastically between private and public employers. It is a
mistake, says the previously mentioned task force, to assume that the quality of
services performed by government employees is lower than the quality of
services rendered by private enterprise employees. Excellent work is
performed in both sectors, and poor quality services are also found in both
sectors. The crucial difference is not what type of organization is providing the
services, but whether employees are given the proper tools to do their work and
management is doing its job. Where public employees have been given a full
and fair chance to preserve their jobs by helping change the system, they have
most often been able to demonstrate their ability to improve the quality of
services and reduce costs. Most commonly this is accomplished through
cooperative union-management relationships, particularly where employees
and their union representatives have a free hand in making improvements, and
participate in defining the ground rules for measuring cost savings and quality
improvements.
THE UNIONS
The Union as a Political Organization
People who are unfamiliar with labor unions often fail to deal with an
important reality: Unions, by their very nature, are political organizations.
34 US Department of Labor, Working Together for Public Service, Report of the US Secretary
of labor’s Task Force on Excellence in State and Local Government Through Labor-
Management Cooperation. Washington, DC: US Department of labor, May 1996, pp.47-49.
(Note: In their discussion on privatization, the authors do not always distinguish between
“privatization” of the entire transit facility and “subcontracting” only a few jobs or services
within the facility).
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Union leaders are elected; managers are appointed. This simple reality has
profound impact on the behavior of unions, their leaders, and rank and file
members. While all unions are political organizations, in the public sector their
goals, strategies, and tactics are even more political than in the private sector.
They have to be. Public-sector unions have learned decades ago that without
influencing voters, political officials, legislators, school boards, commissions,
agency directors and trustees the unions are like fish out of the water. Political
officials control the purse strings of the labor management organizations; these
same politicians put pressure on the labor management individuals who will
ultimately deal with union concerns.
In our interviews, we encountered transit labor relations practitioners who
reported that their union made an “end-run” to the board of directors of the
transit authority, demanding that the general manager of their transit operations
be fired. In some cases, they were let go; in others the general managers found
themselves in such a severe crisis that they re-evaluated their relationship with
the union and actually initiated a program of union-management collaboration
within their operation. We also found a fair number of examples in which
members of the transit board were bothered by press reports of poor labor-
management relations in the transit organizations under their jurisdiction and
put pressure on the transit organization to adopt a more cooperative strategy
toward their unions.
In the public sector, transit union leaders must be doubly skillful in their
political maneuvering. Local union leaders normally work hard to lobby the
board of directors of transit authorities to put pressure on the management of
the transit operating organization to treat the union well in contract
negotiations and other dealings. From a management standpoint, the political
power that transit unions wield is not all bad. That political power is often
being used by transit unions to influence legislators and government
regulators, particularly at the state level, to give favorable consideration to
funding requests by their transit district.
Who Are the Unions?
The transit industry is almost completely unionized. Close to 95 percent of
transit operating and maintenance employees belong to unions.35 The majority
of them today are represented by three major unions:
• Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), which was founded in 1892, has a
claimed membership of about 170, 000 members in 286 local unions in 46
states in the U.S. and nine provinces in Canada. It represents bus, subway,
35 Barnum (1983), p. 14.
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light rail, and ferry operators, as well clerks, mechanics and others in urban
mass transit. Until 1974, the ATU accepted only urban mass transit
employees for membership. In March of that year, it changed its policy and
began organizing non-transit employees as well, particularly when transit
workers were part of a larger city or county government bargaining unit
that included crafts outside the transit field. ATU locals have always had
the power to formulate their own bargaining demands and, for the most
part, control contract negotiations on a local level. This does not mean that
they may not request assistance from national headquarters of the union
during local bargaining. Nationally speaking, the ATU is definitely the
largest union in the country representing transit employees. The other two
unions below represent primarily railroad and airline workers, but do have
concentrations of transit employees in different regions of the country.
• Transportation Workers Union (TWU) claims more than 140,000
members in the U.S. and Canada, including many railroad and airline
workers. It has heavy concentrations of transit union members in New
York and Philadelphia and was founded in 1934 by subway workers in
New York City. Its traditional slogan “One for All, All for One,” is
practically a war cry in the union’s militant history.
• United Transportation Workers Union (UTU), which was founded in
1932, claims around 125,000 members, including a large number of
members working in the railroad industry. Its Local Transit Division
represents only about 8000 members who are bus drivers, bus maintenance
mechanics, and other transit workers.36
When trying to interpret these figures, it is good to remember that these are all
self-reported statistics. Furthermore, when reporting their membership figures,
unions tend to include both active as well as retired members. These
pensioners may generally participate in the election of local union officers but
not on collective bargaining matters. We must also remember that there are
other major unions that represent significant numbers of transit workers. Many
of them cut across a wide range of occupations and industries other than
transit, or they represent only a limited number of job classifications within a
given transit organization. Among these other major unions are the
Transportation Communication Union (TCU), the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT),
36 Source: Internet web pages of the respective unions, accessed between June and November
1999. Also, C.D. Gifford, editor, Directory of U.S. Labor Organizations, 1999 edition.
Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, 1999. Also, Darold T Barnum (1983), chapter 2.
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the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the International
Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAM), the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and a
number of smaller associations representing transit police and security
employees.
Some unions prefer the old adversarial type of collective bargaining; some are
actively pursuing a policy of interest-based bargaining and other forms of
union-management collaboration. The national leadership of the ATU has a
definite policy of encouraging union-management collaboration on the part of
its national leaders. One further characteristic of the ATU is that its national
union leadership heavily favors interest arbitration, which involves a final and
binding decision by third-party neutral when union and management reach an
impasse in contract negotiations. Unions in other industries that have the legal
right to strike tend to shun interest arbitration.
THE STRIKE ENVIRONMENT
In the 1930s, when the Wagner Act with its sweeping labor union protections
was passed, union members could strike without fear of losing their jobs.
Private sector transit employees and their unions still have that right. Public
sector transit employees and their unions, on the other hand, with few
exceptions,37 do not have the legal right to strike. State law usually prohibits
state and local government employees from striking; in practice, some of them
strike anyway. Many states, however, give the governor of that state the right
to seek a court injunction against the striking transit union, private or public
sector, when the strike in the private transit enterprise is believed to seriously
endanger public health and welfare. As an example, under California law,
when in the governor’s opinion a threatened or actual strike endangers public
health, safety or welfare, he may appoint a board to investigate the labor
dispute. While the investigation is going on, any strike is prohibited. When the
governor receives the report from the investigative report, the governor may
instruct the state’s attorney general to petition the court to enjoin such a strike.
The court must issue an injunction if it finds that the strike will significantly
disrupt public transportation services and endanger public health, safety or
welfare. The California law, however, carefully points out that nothing in this
special emergency law “shall be construed to grant or deprive employees of a
37 One such exception is California, where the state’s enabling legislation that created transit
districts and transit authorities specifically allows the strike. Note, however, that the
Amalgamated Transit Union is philosophically opposed to the strike and favors contractually
required interest arbitration in case of an impasses in contract negotiations.
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right to strike.”38
If a strike is legal, can transit employers hire strike-breakers? In the 1930s
shortly after the passage of the Wagner Act, the courts said the law did not
allow employers to hire permanent striker replacements. A little more than
three years after the passage of the Wagner Act, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1938 ruled that employers could hire permanent replacements for
workers who were striking for economic reasons, as opposed to workers
striking because of an unfair labor practice committed by the employer.
Typically, such an unfair labor practice would be a clearly demonstrated
failure of an employer to bargain in good faith with the union. Still, for more
than four decades, employers used this right to hire permanent striker
replacements very sparingly. Employers feared violence from striking workers
walking the picket line, adverse reactions from pro-union consumers,
unionized suppliers, the community, and even government intervention.
President Reagan's firing of 11,500 illegally striking air traffic controllers in
1981 changed all that.
Air traffic controllers are federal employees, and federal employees do not
have the legal right to strike. In the past, federal employees had struck many
times anyway. President Reagan, effectively the CEO of all federal employees,
took drastic action. When after a stern warning, even an ultimatum, the air
traffic controllers' union continued the strike, Reagan ordered all strikers to be
fired, and he immediately authorized the hiring of striker replacements.
Employers all over the country followed his example. In addition, union power
in this country had already started to decline, making political retaliation in
case of striker replacements unlikely. At that time, plenty of cheaper non-union
workers had become available because of wage stagnation. Employers like
Greyhound, Eastern Airlines, and Caterpillar argued publicly that they were in
dire financial straits, and privately they found it profitable to replace strikers
with new hires who were promised permanent employment. The mere threat of
permanently replacing strikers broke a five-month old month strike by UAW at
Caterpillar in 1992. In 1988, International Paper Corporation reduced its
workforce by 20 percent and abolished premium pay after replacing strikers
permanently. Two years later, 80 percent of its workforce consisted of
replacement workers.39 As was discussed regarding the two Greyhound
strikes, Greyhound Lines followed a similar strike replacement strategy, but
38 B. E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, 9th edition, vol. 2. San Francisco: Bancroft-
Whitney Co, 1987, p. 444.
39 Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, Labor Relations, 9th ed. Upper Saddle River, N. J.:
Prentice Hall, 1997, pp. 133-135.
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still went bankrupt.
Today the mere threat of permanently replacing striking workers with new
hires has become a source of negotiating power for employers. Despite years
of aggressive political lobbying, organized labor has been unsuccessful in
trying to get legislation passed that would outlaw permanent strike
replacements. Yet transit employers, whether private or public sector, still find
it risky to adopt a permanent striker replacement strategy. In the first place,
public opinion counts heavily in the transit industry, more so than in many
others. Unions have become more and more skillful in influencing public
opinion during a labor dispute. Profitable transit operation depends heavily on
good community relations. Secondly, the hiring and training of new drivers,
dispatchers, and maintenance mechanics is costly and filled with risks. Transit
unions are quick to point out to the press that public safety has been
endangered when a transit facility has put poorly trained new hires in jobs
previously held by employees with many years of experience. Any preventable
accident by a replacement bus or trolley driver is surely going to be blown out
of proportion in a press interview with a transit union representative. It's smart
politics. Management has a legal right to keep operating during an economic
strike by hiring temporary or permanent striker replacements (See “Unfair
Labor Practices Strike” below). The U.S. General Accounting Office states
that in about one-third of strikes, employers announce that they would hire
permanent replacements if striking employees do not return to work by certain
date––and estimated that in about 17 percent of all strikes the employer
actually did hire permanent replacements––and about four percent of striking
workers were replaced. 40
There are risks for both employers and strikers when strike replacements are
hired. For the replacement worker who is hired on a temporary basis during a
strike it means that he or she will be out of a job again when the strikers go
back to work after a settlement. If replacement strikers are hired with an
implied or expressed promise of permanent employment and are let go again
after a settlement with the union is reached, they may sue the employer for
misrepresentation or breach of contract. Usually it is not easy to permanently
replace all striking employees. During and after the strike, tensions between
strikers and strike replacements may lead to violence and community disorder.
In 1993 Congress considered legislation introduced by the Democrats
prohibiting the hiring of permanent striker replacements. The Democrats could
40 William H. Holley, Jr., and Kenneth M. Jennings, The Labor Relations Process, 6th edition.
New York: The Dryden Press, 1997, p. 277-282.
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not overcome the Republican opposition and the bill failed. In 1995, President
Clinton tried to issue an executive order that would make employers who hire
permanent strike replacements ineligible for federal contracts. It too failed
after a U.S. Court of Appeals struck it down in February 1996 by saying that
the Executive Order “undermines the National Labor Relations Act, under
which, the courts have held, employers may permanently replace strikers.”41
In Unfair Labor Practices Strikes, should the NLRB find that a strike was
caused by an employer’s unfair labor practice, such as a refusal to bargain in
good faith, and the employer is found to be guilty the unfair practice, strikers
may be entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
However, strikers engaging during the strike in illegal misconduct need not be
reinstated; for example, strikers physically preventing other employees to enter
the plant, jumping in front of moving cars or trucks, stalking non-striking
employees, throwing rocks, eggs, and other disruptive misconduct. The main
criterion defining illegal conduct is whether the action or misconduct coerced
or intimidated non-strikers in the exercise of their legal rights.
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE TRANSIT STRIKE
A strike, or threat of a strike, plays a strong political role in the transit
environment, much more so than in most other industries. Whether a transit
worker strike is legal or illegal in a given state or locale is not the point.
History shows that strike prohibitions do not eliminate strikes. A union leader
who has been thrown in jail for violating a strike prohibition is twice as likely
to win the next few union elections than one who doesn’t have martyr status.
More often than not, the threat of a strike is just as powerful a weapon as an
actual strike. A strike, or threat of a strike, may actually place an important
political tool in the hands of transit managers. Politically skilled transit
managers in both the private and public sector know that a strike, threatened or
real, may help them in their request to political bodies for additional funding or
approval for fare increases. Barnum (1977) stated:
So even in those cases where the strike is illegal, the threat of a
strike is seldom absent from the bargaining table. This fact has been
confirmed by numerous interviews by this author.
In both privately and publicly owned transit companies, the strike is
primarily a politico-economic weapon. That this is so in the public
sector requires little elaboration. A public sector strike puts
41
“Clinton Order Discouraging Striker Replacement Is Voided,” New York Times,
February 3, 1996, Section 1, p. 9.
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economic pressure on the voters who benefit from the service. The
voters put political pressure on their elective representatives to settle
the disputes. As the elected representatives generally have direct
control over the transit system, or appoint its decision makers, they
can take action to resolve the impasse.
When a strike occurs in a privately owned transit system, both
economic and political pressures are placed on the private managers.
The potential of lost profits exerts economic pressure. But by far the
strongest pressure on management is politico-economic. Recall that
a transit system can generally maintain a fair rate of return as long as
fare increases are granted by the public utilities commission or city
council. But these are public bodies, generally appointed by local or
state politicians or directly elected. Hence they are susceptible to
political pressure. And a transit strike typically arouses the citizens
and results in pressures to end it.42
There are times when the political pressure of a strike threat takes more subtle
forms. In private transit systems, a contract settlement between union and
management may be conditional. The settlement may be tied to the transit
system receiving financial assistance from a political body or approval for a
fare increase. No experienced management negotiator would make such an
offer to a union without having explored with the political body the likelihood
of such requests being granted. Nor would he or she neglect to point out to the
political body or political officials the consequences of denial of the request.
No union negotiator would negotiate such a settlement without having made it
clear that there would be a strike if the terms of the conditional settlement
would not be met. In reality, what both parties may have done in cases like this
is to buy some time for the political processes to be played out, without having
to face a strike. That political process most likely would involve the union
using its political power to influence political bodies and political officials to
approve the request for fare increase or direct financial assistance to the transit
system, among other things.43
THE POLITICAL COMPLEXITIES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Collective bargaining in publicly owned transit facilities takes place in a
complex political environment. External political pressures from state,
municipal, and county governments, as well as community interest groups, are
42 Barnum (1983), p. 92.
43 For a more extensive discussion of the political functions of the strike, or threat of strike, in
the transit industry, see Barnum (1983), pp. 92-95.
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enormous, and they often frustrate negotiators and other labor practitioners to
no end. One public official said:
The Transit Authority pretty much gets its orders from the mayor’s
office, and it [the Transit Authority] tells the negotiators for the
transit facility what they can and cannot do. There are so many
issues that are “off-limits.” For example, pension benefits may be
governed by the state and can’t be bargained over at the local level.
The county government may tell you what you can negotiate in the
way of employee health benefits, if your transit employees are
county employees. The county government won’t let you negotiate
anything that’s not in parity with other county employees. And the
list goes on and on.44
Many public transit operations are subject to political pressures from at least
three local sources. First, there is the Transit Authority, created by state-
enabling legislation (to be discussed later). It is usually governed by a Transit
Board, a Board of Directors, or a Board of Trustees. Its functions are usually
spelled out by the enabling state legislation that created the transit district and
its transit authority. Transit board members may be elected or appointed.
Theoretically, its functions are similar to the Board of Directors of a private
corporation. In practice, there is a world of difference because transit board
members tend to be political appointees; they are put into office by politically
oriented individuals or groups.
Transit board members may be appointed by the mayor of a city, city council,
county board of supervisors, or other political body. A board typically
exercises tight control over public transit operations, particularly budget
matters, passenger fares, bus or train routes and schedules. In addition, many
cities or metropolitan transit districts have so-called City Transit Commissions,
Transportation Commissions, or Citizens Advisory Committee. They are even
more political in nature. Members usually represent certain interest groups in
the community. Typically the commission is supposed to provide advice to the
Transit Board regarding the community’s wants and needs.45 While it is not
meant to interact directly with officials who run the transit operation, but
merely give advice to the elected or appointed board, its influence on transit
operations can be significant and often politically biased.
44 Telephone interview with a staff member of the American Public Transit Association,
January 14, 2000.
45 Interview with Trixie Johnson, Research Director, Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose
State University, March 8, 2000.
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Finally, a special case is transit districts that are created by so-called “Joint
Power Agreement.” They are basically transit districts that cut across two or
more transit authority jurisdictions and involve two or more local
governments. This condition complicates the political implications of transit
labor relations even further. A more detailed discussion of this aspect would go
beyond the scope of this report.
LEADERSHIP STYLE
Generally speaking, the management of public transit organizations tends to be
rather traditional in their leadership style. In practice this means that
management tends to be hierarchy-oriented and values stability more than
change, tends to lean toward centralization more than decentralization of
authority, and often lacks the flexibility needed to launch innovation labor
relations programs.46
First-line supervisors often lack the leadership training needed to relate well to
the people they supervise. According to a national survey, almost all
supervisors of bus operators are promoted from the ranks of bus operators. It is
practically the only promotional opportunity for the vast majority of transit bus
operators without additional education or experience. Realistically, there is
little in the job as bus operator that prepares them for the job of leading others.
The system expects first-line supervisors to be control oriented, to enforce
rules and punish non-compliance. Bus operators frequently complain that the
only time they hear from their supervisor is when they are in trouble.47 These
conditions make innovative labor relations practices and changes in leadership
styles very difficult. Many transit organizations have recognized this and have
in recent years initiated large-scale training programs for supervisors,
emphasizing leadership skills and communications skills more than technical
and administrative skills. The National Transit Institute, which offers a wide
range of transit specific courses in these areas, has been of great help to many
transit organizations that have been trying to fill this gap.48 Where transit
46 Mercer Management Consulting and TAB Associates, Inc., Innovative Labor-Management
Practices, unpublished draft of Final Report. Washington, DC: Transit Cooperative Research
Program, Transit Research Board, 1997.
47 Gayland K. Moffat and Diane R. Blackburn, Changing Roles and Practices of Bus Field
Supervisors. Synthesis of Transit Practice 16, Transit Cooperative Research Program, Transit
Research Board. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996, pp. 1-2.
48 Readers who are interested in these programs may contact: National Transit Institute
Rutgers University, 120 Albany Street, Suite 705, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2163
Tel 732-932-1700, Fax 732-932-1707
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organizations have successfully embraced interest-based bargaining and joint
labor-management problem solving teams, these programs have almost always
been accompanied by extensive leadership training at all levels, by efforts to
change the organizational culture, and efforts to decentralize decision making
and enhance employee empowerment.
THE NEW LABOR ECONOMICS
Although there have been many exceptions, the transit industry has been
slower than many others in forming labor-management partnerships in order to
solve the economic problems on both sides. As we shall see in a later chapter
on that topic, however, there have been dramatic success stories of union-
management cooperation in transit.
Years ago, market competition in the transit industry was minimal. Starting in
1974, the Arab oil embargoes created severe gasoline shortages and increased
gasoline prices, which impacted transit ridership substantially. Commuters and
shoppers looked more and more toward transit systems for their transportation
needs, particularly in cities where traffic congestion became an added problem.
Transit ridership soared to the point where transit providers had a hard time
keeping up with the demand for transportation. Transit ridership increased in
1973 for the first time, after 27 years of declining ridership. In many places,
local politicians became friends of transit systems again. Buses became more
modern and stylish. Customer service and transit marketing efforts
improved.49 Environmentalists were pleased to see buses use alternative fuels
to reduce air pollution. Ridership continued to grow even after the oil embargo
was lifted. Light rail transit also made a strong comeback, particularly in
California.50 Union-management contracts contained generous benefits for
workers during this period. During the first half of the 1970s, wage levels in
transit had increased 47 percent faster than the cost of living.51
All that has changed. In the last two decades or so, our nation’s economy and
workplaces have changed in response to ever increasing global competition,
deregulation of major industries, rapid technological innovations, and the end
of the Cold War. While transit industry competition may not be global, the
49 Darold T. Barnum (1983), p. 9
50 Bob Blymer, “Transit in California: A Chronological History,” Transit California,
November 1996, pp. 18-26.
51 Gordon F. Fielding, Managing Public Transit Strategically, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 1987. Also, Charles A. Lave, “Is Part-time Transit a Cure for Transit Deficits?”
Traffic Quarterly, Vol. 34 (1980), pp. 61-62.
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threat of competition certainly exists. The competitive threats may take the
form of privatization, competition for public funding, competition from other
transit organizations, competition from para-transit, or other forms.
In the past, union and management have dealt with the economic issues largely
through adversarial, even hostile, collective bargaining. Labor and
management were in competition with each other. They competed over how
big a slice of a fixed-size economic pie, or profits, each would get. Both were
willing to endure a strike, if necessary. The old way worked for both sides, at
least most of the time. It worked largely because the parties could take labor
cost out of the competition. That has changed. Now labor cost is a bigger factor
than ever for transit employers to remain financially solvent and for unions to
protect the income and job security of their members. The old model, often
called distributive bargaining, seems to be unable to deal with increasing
competition, global or otherwise. The old model seemed to have been unable
to adapt to the new economic environment.
A new model emerged––that of interest-based bargaining, or integrative
bargaining.52 It is called interest-based because the parties focus on each
other’s interests and needs, rather than on positions. It is called integrative
because each party integrates into its own goals and objectives the needs and
problems of the other side and seeks to solve them in a mutual problem-
solving approach. 53 When that process endures over time and expands into a
wide range of non-economic interests and problems, we call it labor-
management partnership. As we shall see in a later chapter, it has worked well
for many private and public sector organizations and their unions. The thinking
and organizational cultures of both union and employer have moved away
from the idea of competing over the largest possible piece of a fixed pie,
toward enlarging the pie through mutual effort, and thereby both sides
benefiting from having a larger pie to share.
It appears that both approaches co-exist today, even though they are
diametrically opposed. Both seem to work, at least for the time being. As a
matter of fact, in many cases the same negotiators alternate between the two
approaches.54 At the beginning of new contract negotiations, on the easier
52 For the originators of this model which contrasts distributive and integrative bargaining, see
Richard E. Walton and Robert McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
53 This approach is often called win-win negotiations. Professional trainers generally avoid that
term because they want to keep the concept of “winning” out of that process, and more toward
“problem solving.”
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issues, they may genuinely collaborate with each other in a mutual problem-
solving type of approach. Later on in the negotiations, when the parties have to
face the harder economic issues, such as wage and benefit increases or shutting
down a certain part of the operations, the negotiators may return to the old,
traditional way of adversarial bargaining. When contract negotiations are
concluded, they may again return to mutual problem solving in year-round
labor-management committees. And in some cases one side or the other may
decide that interest-bargaining was a failure and abandon the process. In our
research we even encountered cases in which the parties abandoned the
partnership only to go back to it again a year or two later, with or without a
change in management or union leadership.
With this coexistence of the two processes in mind, John Calhoun Wells, the
former director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, has come
up with a new “transitional” model, which he calls “Conflictive Partnership.”55
He believes that his model, at least for the time being, is a realistic alternative
to the traditional, adversarial model of collective bargaining, and an equally
realistic alternative to the cooperative model. He points out that in response to
competitive pressures, labor-management relations have expanded into
diametrically opposed directions. The traditional, adversarial approach is on
one extreme end, and the cooperative approach is on the other. The cooperative
model, he points out, requires trust, achieving common ground, information
sharing, joint problem solving, risk taking, and innovation. But the amount of
trust required is enormous; it must be slowly earned over time, and is very
easily lost. He points out that there are distinct institutional differences
between unions and management, and differences in interest, which will
inevitably lead to conflict. But the two sides also have certain interests in
common. Among them are mutual concerns for employee safety and health,
income and job security for employees, quality of work life, and, of course, the
bottom line––the financial stability of the employer. It is these shared interests
that make labor-management partnerships possible.
Conflict need not destroy a cooperative relationship. On the contrary, conflict
may make the parties work harder to find solutions to problems that affect both
sides. Both sides need to respect the institutional differences between union
54 Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and
Industrial Relation, 2nd ed. Boston: Irwin-McGraw-Hill, 2000, pp. 191-192.
55 John Calhoun Wells, Conflictive Partnership: A Strategy for Real-World Labor-
Management Cooperation. Presentation at the Tenth National Labor-Management Conference,
Chicago, Illinois, April 26, 2000. The paper also appeared in the 1996 IRRA Spring Meeting
Proceedings, as well as in the August 1996 issue of the Labor Law Journal.
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and management, which inevitably create conflict over differences in interests.
At the same time they need to develop and maintain a recognition of their
common interests and find creative ways of mutual problem solving to meet
these interests. Wells calls these interests “mutual self-interests.” The most
basic of these are “profits and jobs.” Less obvious are safety and health, quality
of work life, workforce education and training, quality of product and service,
productivity, and customer satisfaction. As the parties experience success and
mutual trust in putting these ideas to work, the basic question of “what’s in it
for me” becomes “what’s in it for us.” When the parties reach that point, they
have achieved the shared vision, shared goals, and shared strategy needed for a
successful labor-management partnership. That partnership must involve
shared decision-making and willingness on both sides to “run the business
together.” That, of course, is the ideal labor-management partnership. We may
never fully realize this ideal, but we can be successful in trying. Conflict,
however, will always be there. It’s not a question of how we can eliminate it,
but how we deal with it.
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THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
OF TRANSIT LABOR RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
There is no uniform labor law that governs the entire transit industry. The legal
framework of labor relations in the transit industry is a hodgepodge of state
and federal statutes, local ordinances, executive orders, and court decisions.
Even the experts find it difficult to sort out the pieces. One huge problem is
that the industry is split into private and public-sector enterprises, each with its
own complicated and very diverse legal framework. While the private sector is
not quite as complicated as the public sector, it is still difficult to get a handle
on the many legal restrictions placed on the transit employer, and the legal
protections afforded unions and employees in the private transit sector. The
chapter on the history of transit labor relations and the chapter on the economic
and political environment of transit labor relations shed some light on how
these overlapping legal aspects of the industry evolved. The complicated legal
framework developed over time was that small private transit companies found
it impossible to compete with the private automobile and local, state, and
federal government had to come to their rescue. More on this later in this
chapter in our discussion of the “Memphis Formula” and “Section13(c)
Collective Bargaining.” To add to the complication, some states still prohibit
collective bargaining for state and local government workers. In order to
qualify for federal transit subsidies, they passed complicated state legislation to
exempt transit workers from the prohibitions against other public sector
employees in their state. It is interesting to note that these complicated
legislative measures are in many cases precisely what drove transit unions and
transit management into close cooperation in collective bargaining.
PRIVATE SECTOR TRANSIT EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
As was discussed in the history chapter, the earliest transit services were
rendered by small private companies. Then, starting in the 1960s, the trend was
for the small as well as the large private companies to be taken over by public
transit authorities because they could not remain financially viable. Whether or
not private transit is more efficient and cost effective has been discussed in the
chapter “The Economic and Political Environment of Transit.”
When a transit organization is in the private sector, its legal status is reasonably
well known. Private-sector employers, employees, and unions are covered by
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.56 The original version of that
law, popularly called the Wagner Act of 1935, only protected the collective
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bargaining rights of employees and their unions. It did not protect employers. It
guaranteed private sector employees the right to self-determination through
collective bargaining and prohibited employers from interfering with those
rights. At the core of the Wagner Act were five unfair labor practices, or
prohibitions, for employers, often simply called “ULPs.”
• To interfere with employees' rights to bargain collectively through unions
of their own choosing.
• To dominate the formation or administration of labor unions, by financial
support or the creation of company unions. ("Company unions" are unions
created by the employer, usually for the purpose of keeping out
"legitimate" unions.)
• To discriminate or retaliate against employees or job applicants because of
union membership or union sympathy.
• To discriminate against employees because they filed charges under this
law.
• To refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith with unions of their
employees' choosing.
The Wagner Act also created a powerful federal agency, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), to interpret and enforce the law. The NLRB
investigates alleged violations of these Unfair Labor Practices and may issue a
cease and desist order if a complaint is found justified. Unless they choose to
appeal the order in federal court, employers must obey the order. The NLRB
normally does not have the power to impose fines or other penalties upon
employers, except it may award back pay plus interest to employees who have
suffered financial harm as the result of an employer’s unfair labor practice. If
an employer ignores a cease and desist order, the NLRB takes him to court.
The cease and desist power of the NLRB should not be underestimated,
however. It has given the board far more power than the ability to simply apply
the law. It can interpret and reinterpret the law and thereby make public policy.
New board members are appointed by the President of the United States with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
A second major function of the NLRB is to conduct secret ballot elections to
let employees decide whether they want collective bargaining and, if so, which
union they want to serve as their exclusive bargaining representative. In past
decades, these elections have resulted in widespread union organization and
56 Railroads and Airlines are covered by a different law
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representation.57
One of the problems with these appeals, from a union point of view, is that
while the employer appeals a NLRB unfair labor practice decision in court, the
employer need not obey these cease-and-desist orders. Of course, each of these
appeals is subject to a higher-level review by another court. The appeals
process is so long that by the time it has been exhausted and the cease-and-
desist order must be obeyed, most employees who are affected by it have
already left the company or are retired.
As one can well imagine, the one-sidedness of the Wagner Act raised a storm
of protests and years of aggressive lobbying efforts by employers. Employers
were incensed that the Act spelled out illegal ULPs only for employers and not
for unions. In other words, unions could resort to unfair practices like
intimidation of employees in union organizing campaign, but employers could
not. Nevertheless, the Wagner Act stood unamended for 12 years, until 1947.
In the meantime, unions grew by leaps and bounds and gained enormously in
power. Employers complained bitterly that the Wagner Act was an unfair, one-
sided law. The very practices employers were prohibited to engage in could be
pursued by unions freely and legally. It was illegal for employers to coerce or
intimidate employees in their choice of unions and collective bargaining, but it
was not illegal for unions to coerce employees into joining their ranks. It was
illegal for employers to refuse or neglect to bargain in good faith, but unions
could say "no" all day long.
By 1947 unions had become very strong, too strong in the eyes of the average
citizen and the government. Unions had become so powerful that a whole
industry could be shut down. After World War II, a wave of strikes hit the
country. From the standpoint of an impassioned unionist, it was a normal
development. During wartime, strikes are usually prohibited by law so as not
to inhibit the war effort. Wages and benefits are frozen. The union leadership is
anxious to appear patriotic and complies with the law. When the war is over,
unions want to "catch up." They want to make up for the wage and benefit
increases sacrificed during the war. Employers do not share this view and
regard the new union demands as outrageous. Massive and widespread strikes
become inevitable.
57 Contrary to popular misconception, the NLRB generally does not get involved in contract
administration, such as grievance handling and grievance arbitration. Disputes over the
application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties are
usually handled through private arbitration procedures. Federal or state government agencies
may aid the parties in finding qualified private arbitrators but generally do not do arbitration
themselves.
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In addition to these circumstances, the 1946 election brought a relatively
conservative Congress to power. It reflected the increasingly negative attitude
of the public toward unions. As a result of all these factors, in 1947 Congress
passed dramatic amendments to the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. The
amendments turned out to be more voluminous than the original 1935 law. The
amendments were therefore given the name of a separate law, the Labor-
Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act (named after
its authors, Senator Robert Taft and Congressman Fred Hartley). Since the
1947 law incorporated all of the union protection provisions of the older 1935
law, lawyers and textbooks frequently regard the two laws as one, and simply
refer to it as the National Labor Relations Act, as Amended.
The 1947 amendments sought to balance the power between labor and
management by adding a number of unfair and prohibited practices of unions
to the law. Among the major prohibited union practices are these:
• Coercing employees into joining a union or interfering with their choice to
be or not to be represented by a union for the purpose of collective
bargaining. An exception to this is the "union shop" agreement in the
collective bargaining contract to be discussed later.
• Coercing employers to discriminate against employees because they refuse
to join a union. Again the union shop agreement to be discussed later is an
exception.
• Interfering with the rights of employers to chose their own bargaining
representatives. This prohibition includes attempts to force employers to
bargain or not to bargain through an employers association, an outside law
firm, or any member inside their own organization.
• Refusal to bargain in good faith with employers. In practice this means
unions, as well as employers, must demonstrate a willingness to reach
agreement. They cannot present the other side with a "take it or leave it"
ultimatum, but must demonstrate good faith by making alternate proposals
and counter proposals.
• Jurisdictional strikes by unions, meaning strikes to force an employer to
assign certain jobs to members of one union instead of members of another
union. This is a frequent tactic that was used in the construction trades.
• Secondary boycotts, meaning boycotts against an employer not directly
involved in a dispute with a particular union. As an example, a union
refusing to let the employees it represents work on parts or products
produced elsewhere by a non-union company or a by a company with
whom another union has a dispute.
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• Featherbedding demands by unions, which are demands for pay for work
not actually performed, or demands on employers to have employees
perform unnecessary work.
• Excessive or discriminatory union initiation and membership fees. The
judgment of what is excessive or discriminatory is left to the NLRB.
In addition to these prohibited union practices, the Taft-Hartley Act imposed a
number of restrictions on both parties in what they could include in the
collective bargaining agreement. Among these restrictions are:
• A ban on the closed shop agreement. Such an agreement is a negotiated
contract clause in the collective bargaining contract, requiring employers to
hire only union members. In other words, a job applicant has to be a union
member before hire. In effect, employers surrender the hiring function to
the union under this type of agreement. The union determines who gets
admitted to union membership, hence the union controls hiring. The closed
shop is not the same as a union shop agreement. The latter does not require
union membership before hire but after hire, which is usually 30 days. The
union shop is legal under federal law in the private sector, but often
outlawed in the public sector. A very controversial section in the Taft-
Hartley Act, however, makes it possible for individual state laws to outlaw
the union shop even in the private sector within their borders. Such state
laws prohibiting the union shop and other union security provisions in the
union-management agreement are usually called "right-to-work laws," and
states that have such laws on the books are referred to as "right-to-work
states."
• A second restriction on the content of collective bargaining agreements is
concerned with dues check-off. It is a negotiated contract clause requiring
employers to collect union dues through payroll deduction. Payroll
deduction for union dues is now allowed only for those employees who
have voluntarily signed a payroll authorization to that effect.
Another amendment of the National Labor Relations Act makes it possible for
the federal government to invoke a "cooling-off period" when a strike threatens
national health and safety. After satisfying certain procedural requirements, the
President of the United States may request the Attorney General to seek an 80-
day strike injunction in a U.S. district court. If granted, employees are required
to return or continue to work for that period. In the meantime a variety of
government-aided settlement attempts are launched. If a settlement has not
been reached at the end of the 80-day period, unions are free to strike and
employers free to lock out.
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The original Wagner Act of 1935 excluded from its coverage all public
employees (mostly government employees), airline and railroad employees,
agricultural employees, and domestic employees. The Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 added supervisors to that list of exclusions.
As far as federal law is concerned, today s private sector transit employers,
employees and their unions are still covered by the protections and
prohibitions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and fall under
the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Keep in mind that other federal laws, such as
ERISA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and others, must also be considered.
In addition they may also be subject to state legislation created specifically for
the entire transit sector in the state or only for certain transit districts. For
transit employers, employees and their unions who belong to the public sector,
the legal environment is a different one.
PUBLIC SECTOR TRANSIT EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
When we talk of public sector employers and employees, we generally refer to
those who work for federal, state and local governments, and also those who
work for specially created districts, such as transit and water districts. There is
no uniform, all inclusive labor law covering the entire public sector, as we
have in the private sector. There is no equivalent of the National Labor
Relations Act in the public sector. There is only a hodgepodge of separate state
laws, local government ordinances, and a federal law governing only agencies
and employees of the federal government.
Collective bargaining rights for public employees in this country came
relatively late-- much later than in most other developed nations. What
hindered the development of collective bargaining legislation of any kind in
this country was the so-called sovereignty doctrine to which public officials
and other influential Americans subscribed to for many years. That doctrine
basically said government is a sovereign ruler accountable only to the
electorate and the legislature, which hold the ultimate power. Government
cannot share that power with any special interest groups. Unions are
considered to be special interest groups. Collective bargaining rights for public
employees and their unions would mean sharing decision making with unions
and thereby surrendering the sovereignty of government and violating public
trust in government. A few states still subscribe to that philosophy and
continue to prohibit collective bargaining for state and local government
employees. The civil rights movement of the 1960s began to erode support for
the sovereignty doctrine and the notion that government employees are citizens
that ought to have the same rights as those in the private sector began to gain
support.
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In 1962 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 which granted
federal government employees and their unions permission to engage in a
limited scope of collective bargaining with their respective federal agencies.
President Kennedy s support of collective bargaining for government
employees gave a tremendous impetus to states following the example of the
federal government. State after state issued executive orders or passed
legislation giving limited collective bargaining rights to certain groups of state
and local government employees. The limits that were usually spelled out
included a ban on the right to strike and a ban on the union shop.58
Since we do not have a single law or a single enforcement agency to govern
public sector labor relations in this country, a consistent state and local
government labor policy toward public sector bargaining does not exist. Some
states even continue to prohibit collective bargaining in government, while in
others virtually all civil service employees are in one bargaining unit. Most
states forbid public employees to strike, but some permit strikes under certain
conditions. Such extreme legal variations are in stark contrast to other
industrialized nations, which tend to have a single national collective
bargaining law for all public workers.59 Public policy toward labor-
management relations is even more complicated in the public transit sector.
THE MEMPHIS FORMULA
The so-called Memphis Formula is a clever device to bypass a state’s legal
restrictions on public sector collective bargaining by having public transit
authorities contract out its transit services to a privately owned transit
company. In the city of Memphis, Tennessee, bus service had been provided
since 1896 by a private transit company called the Memphis Street Railway
Company. But starting in the mid 1940s, that private transit company had
experienced financial problems. By 1960, bus ridership and revenues had
declined so much that the stockholders wanted to sell the company. One of the
major factors in the company’s inability to operate profitably was the constant
refusal of the City Commission to approve fare increases.60 The restrictions
and pressures that the two major investment companies who owned the
Memphis Street Railway Company placed upon the company did not did not
help its performance either. The city of Memphis, however, had great
58 The union shop means that a clause in the collective bargaining contract has been negotiated
between management and the union which requires employees in the bargaining unit to join
the union within a certain number of days after hire, usually 30 days.
59 Richard C. Kearney, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 3rd edition. New York: Marcel
Decker, Inc., 2001, chapter 3.
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confidence in the management of the Memphis Street Railway Company, but
realized that the transit system needed significant capital improvements, which
the company could not afford. In addition, the city recognized that public
ownership of the transit company would give it significant federal and state tax
advantages.61 The more the city analyzed the situation, the more it became
convinced that it could improve customer service and at the same time operate
the transit system at a profit. In December 1960, Memphis finally purchased
the private Memphis Street Railway Company, but retained its management
and employees. The city negotiated a contract whereby the transit system
would be run on a contract basis by the same management as before, as a
private management company, but supported by public funds.
The city had confidence in the competence of the private sector management
of the company and thought the officers could run the operation more
efficiently without the restrictions the previous owners had put upon them. In
addition, the old company management had a good relationship with the union.
As a matter of fact, the local union, the Amalgamated Transit Union, urged the
Memphis mayor to retain the old company on a contract basis to continue
running the transit operations. And the city of Memphis did just that. The City
Transportation Commission was glad to disassociate itself from the day-to-day
problems of the transit system, including customer complaints about transit
service, fares and routes. The old Board of Street Transportation
Commissioners reorganized itself and became the Memphis Transit Authority.
The new transit authority then hired the management of the previous company
to form a new private management company to continue transit operations
with the same personnel and the same union as before. But the city made sure
that day-to-day transit operations, including labor relations, were kept out of
the hands of the Transit Authority and out of city politics. The Transit
Authority, however, retained close financial control over the management
company and the right to formulate policy.
Had the city of Memphis chosen to have the Memphis Transit Authority
oversee transit operations itself, the collective bargaining rights of its transit
employees would have been voided because the Tennessee Supreme Court had
60 The original City Commission in Memphis was much different from what it became later.
The original Commission had direct budget control over the Memphis Street Railway Company
and thereby great control over its labor relations. All that changed in 1960 when the
Commission turned these controls over to the Memphis Transit Authority and its governing
board.
61 Under the previous private ownership system, the revenues of the Memphis Street Railway
Company were subject to 52% federal income tax alone, in addition to state and local taxes.
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ruled in 1958 that its cities, counties, or other public agencies would violate the
state s right-to-work laws if the city bargained collectively with a union. No
wonder the Memphis local of the Amalgamated Transit Union pleaded with
the mayor, the Transportation Commission, and anyone else who would listen
to retain the services of the old private transit company after the public
takeover. Indeed, this ingenious solution to the problem of preserving
collective bargaining rights of private sector transit employees being taken
over by public transit authorities in states which prohibit collective bargaining
for public employees became a model for other states to follow and heavily
influenced the U.S. Congress in drafting the labor provisions of the Urban
Mass Transit Act of 1964.62
The NLRB and state and federal courts, however, questioned whether the
Memphis Formula really placed the transit management companies, controlled
by public transit or transportation authorities, in the private sector and
therefore under the National Labor Relations Act. For some time, the NLRB
struggled with the question of whether these new transit management
companies really qualified as "employers" under the definition in the National
Labor Relations Act. Keep in mind that the NLRA specifically excludes public
entities from its coverage. In trying to answer this question, the NLRB and the
courts asked how much independent control these companies really have over
labor relations and working conditions, and to what degree they were
controlled by their respective transit or transportation authorities. Eventually
the view that these contracted management companies qualified as private
employers under the NLRA and came under the jurisdiction of the NLRB
prevailed, even though these private transit management companies may be
subject to significant budgetary controls and policies set by public transit
authorities. The degree to which public transit authorities exercise control over
the labor relations policies and practices of the private management companies
depends directly on a state’s enabling legislation that creates these public
transit authorities.
EARLY ENABLING STATE LEGISLATION
In transit, enabling state legislation means state legislation that creates transit
62 James L Stern, Richard U. Miller, Stephen A. Rubenfeld, Craig A. Olson, and Brian P.
Heshizer, "Urban Mass Transit Labor Relations: The Legal Environment," Industrial Relations
Law Journal (now Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law), Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall
1977), pp. 389-420. For a more detailed report by the same authors, see "The Legal
Framework for Collective Bargaining in the Urban Mass Transit Industry," Report No. 76
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, University of Wisconsin, Industrial Relations
Research Institute, November 1976.
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or public utility districts and a certain funded public agency, usually a Transit
Authority, is empowered to operate a transit system in its geographic area itself
or hire or subcontract a private firm to do so. The labor relations portion of that
piece of legislation commonly sets forth the collective bargaining rights and
protections of employees who work directly or indirectly under the transit
authority. Although there may be differences from state to state in the areas of
unfair labor practices, and the right to strike, today these employee rights are
often the same as the rights private-sector employees enjoy under the NLRA,
as amended. But this has not always been so. Still, even in the early years, the
labor provisions in the enabling state legislation have been different from what
other non-transit public employees in the state had. Other public employees of
the state or local government did not even have the right to form unions or seek
collective bargaining.
At the time the city of Memphis took over the old Memphis Street Railway
Company in 1960, it was already empowered by an old state law, Chapter 26
of the Tennessee Private Acts, to create the Memphis Transit Authority and to
purchase or contract for a transit system which would be under the jurisdiction,
control, and management of the Memphis Transit Authority. 63 The statute
continues to spell out the powers of the Memphis Transit Authority if it
chooses to contract with a private company to manage the transit system,
directed and supervised by the Authority in all of its phases including the
setting of rates, fares, and routes.î Memphis circumvented the statutory
provisions by drafting contractual agreements with everybody concerned that
gave the new Memphis Transit Management Company maximum
independence from the Memphis Transit Authority. While the Transit
Authority retained a certain control over financial matters, including the
determination of bus fares and bus routes, the record shows that the Authority
stayed away from labor relations and other personnel matters. The
Management Company continued to bargain freely with the union, signed
union-management contracts, hired and fired its own personnel, and even
made capital purchases, such as buses, without approval from the city or the
Transit Authority.64
Similar state-enabling legislation that created public transit authorities was
passed as far back as the 1940s in other states when many private transit
companies in the country, with their declining financial resources, could no
longer meet the transportation demands of the rapidly expanding metropolitan
63 1943 Tennessee Private Acts, Ch. 26, as amended in 1961 by Ch. 319
64 Stern (1977), p. 399.
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areas. As implied, those early versions of state transit legislation tended to
reflect the state s collective bargaining policy that was radically different from
those for other public employees working for the state or its local governments.
We must remember that in those days almost all states forbade the rest of its
government agencies to bargain collectively with public employees and public
employee unions. It should be noted that most of the relatively pro-collective
bargaining transit statutes passed by the states before 1964 were enacted by
Eastern and Midwestern states. Within these states, transit authorities were
usually established in large metropolitan areas with strong labor unions.
Furthermore, those large cities tended to be in states in which unions held
considerable power and were able to influence the state legislature to protect
union interests. Even at that, transit employees working for these transit
authorities had far less collective bargaining protections than private sector
employees. None of the earlier statutes really compelled the transit authorities
to bargain with transit unions, but merely allowed them to do so if they wished.
In other words, these early state enabling laws were improvements over other
state civil service and public utility laws but they did not give transit
employees hard and fast guarantees that their collective bargaining rights
would be continued when their employers switched from private to public
ownership. That came much later.65
ENABLING STATE LEGISLATION SINCE 1964
Since 1964, enabling state transit legislation has taken on a different character.
The success of the Memphis formula had a great influence on the passage of a
federal transit law, the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 (UMTA), and, in turn,
the UMTA had a profound influence on subsequent state transit legislation.
After 1964, enabling state legislation creating transit districts and transit
authorities was no longer confined to eastern and midwestern states and to
California. Even states in the deep south and other “right to work” states that
did not grant public employees the right to collective bargaining started to pass
enabling state legislation, making an exception for public transit employees. In
many cases, it became easy to do so by simply empowering the regional public
transit authorities to hire a private transit company to run transit operation, as
Memphis did. As long as the transit authorities did not control these private
management companies too closely and did not participate in its labor
relations, they qualified as private employers coming under the National Labor
Relations Act and the jurisdiction of the NLRB. In other cases, where a transit
authority was expected to run transit operations itself, outright exceptions to
65 Stern (1977), pp. 401-402.
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the ban on public employee collective bargaining were made for transit
authorities, public transit employees and their unions.
While deliberating the passage of the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964,
Congress debated long and hard over Section 13(c) of that act. That section
was to guarantee employees of private transit companies acquired with federal
funds the ability to retain the same collective bargaining rights and benefits
they enjoyed before they were taken over by public transit authorities. But how
would that be possible in states that at that time still prohibited collective
bargaining in public employment? Congress saw in the example of the city of
Memphis a way out of the dilemma. Senator Morse of Oregon sponsored the
now famous Section 13(c) amendment to the UMTA. He predicted that the
Memphis Formula would become the way of protecting the collective
bargaining rights and benefits of transit employees whose private employers
were being acquired by public transit authorities with federal funds. He was
right.
Time and experience has taught us that he was correct in believing that the
Memphis formula would become a politically useful tool in circumventing
state laws that prohibit its public sector agencies to bargain collectively with
their employees.66 Dozens of cities and metropolitan areas followed the
example of Memphis to qualify for federal capital grants under the UMTA.
Today many states have transit legislation in which the labor protection
provisions are practically identical to the collective bargaining protections in
Section 13(c) of the UMTA. In California, for example, where transit- enabling
legislation is contained in the Public Utilities Codes, one finds language like
this to guarantee public sector transit employees practically the same collective
bargaining rights as private sector employees.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid protection. 67
Concerted activities includes strikes. In that respect, however, California is an
exception. In most other states, all state and local government employees,
including those working for transit authorities, are prohibited from striking.
Whenever a public transit authority acquires a private sector transit company,
66 Stern (1977), p. 394.
67 State of California Public Utilities Code, Section 10300.
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those employees must not suffer any worsening of wages, seniority, pension,
vacation or other benefits as a result of the acquisition if the transit authority
wants to remain eligible for federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transit
Act. As a matter of fact, the transit authority is obligated to assume and
observe all existing labor contracts of the acquired entity.68 As just mentioned,
in most states, the exception to this is the right to strike. When private sector
transit employees become public sector employees, they almost always lose the
right to strike.
UMTA Section 13(c)
By the time the 1960s had arrived, many private transit companies were no
longer profitable, and were forced into takeover by state and local
governments. Public transit authorities, however, were in no better shape
financially than their private counterparts. The federal government had to
come to the rescue. Congress passed the Urban Mass Transit Act (UMTA) in
1964, making significant capital grants available for public takeover of private
carriers. As always, there were strings attached to federal assistance. Some of
them were designed to preserve the collective bargaining rights and gains of
private transit company employees about to become employees of the public
sector, which up to that time had less legal protections of collective bargaining
than the private sector.
The Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 in Section 13(c) requires, among other
things, that transit workers whose private places of employment are acquired
by public agencies be protected against a worsening of their employment
conditions, and that they be guaranteed the continuation of collective
bargaining rights and benefits if state or local transit authorities wish to qualify
for federal funding. When the act was written, many states and their courts
were still vehemently opposed to collective bargaining by public employees.
As a result of energetic lobbying by transit worker unions, Congress not only
concluded that it had to preserve the collective bargaining rights of private
transit company employees about to become public employees, but also the
gains they had made up to that time under private sector collective bargaining.
These protections apply not only when federal funds are used by state and local
authorities to buy out private transit companies, but also when federal money is
used to modernize transit facilities. For example, a transit authority using
federal funds to automate transit facilities has to make sure that the transit
workers displaced by the automation do not suffer a worsening of their
employment conditions as a result of the changes. In practice, this often means
that the affected workers are either assigned to jobs with equal or better pay,
68 State of California Public Utilities Code, Section 10350.
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retained for other jobs, or they are offered generous early retirement benefits.
These protective provisions in the 13(c) agreements, which are separate from
the collective bargaining contract, require the approval of the U.S. Secretary of
Labor before the U.S. Secretary of Transportation can release federal funds to
transit authorities. Although these "13(c) agreements" are technically separate
from the collective bargaining agreement, they set forth in rather specific terms
how transit employee's collective bargaining rights and working conditions are
to be preserved under the union-management contract. Since these separate
13(c) agreements require the consent of both union and management, the union
has in effect considerable power in collective bargaining negotiations. The
union's refusal to sign off on a 13(c) agreement in the legally appropriate time
period can literally mean the financial downfall of a transit system and adverse
political consequences for officials. As Matthew Bodah, who has written
extensively on that subject, has observed: The threat of discontinuance of
federal money seems far more frightening to a local political body than does
union bargaining power.69
Many of these 13(c) agreements provide for interest arbitration70 in case of an
impasse in collective bargaining negotiations, as does a model 13(c) agreement
negotiated in 1975 by the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) and a transit
employers association, the American Public Transit Association (APTA). The
courts have held that interest arbitration is not required under the Urban Mass
Transit Act (UMTA), that other mandatory impasse resolution procedures,
such as mediation and fact-finding, satisfy the requirements of section 13(c) of
the act.
The original Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 has been amended many times.
In 1991 it was redesignated the Federal Transit Act.71 The labor protection
provisions in Section 13(c) stayed the same. During the Reagan and Bush
69 Mathew M. Bodah, “Twenty-five Years of Collective Bargaining under the Urban Mass
Transit Act of 1964,” Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 1990), p. 45.
70 Interest arbitration differs from grievance or rights arbitration in that it deals with disputes
over the making of a new contract. Grievance or rights arbitration, on the other hand, has to do
with disputes over the interpretation, application, or alleged violation of an already existing
contract. In any form of arbitration, when union and management reach an impasse, they
submit the dispute to neutral party for a final and binding decision.
71 A more comprehensive guide to the labor protection provisions in this act than we have
provided here can be found in the following Transportation Research Board publication: G.
Kent Woodman, Jane Sutter Starke, and Leslie D. Schwartz, Transit Labor Protection - A
Guide to Section 13(c) Federal Transit Act. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board,
Legal Research Digest No. 4, June 1995.
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Administrations, federal transportation officials took a strong stand against
maintaining the 13(c) labor protections. The Department of Transportation
(DOT) even advocated a repeal of section 13(c). It testified to that effect before
Congress and tried to negotiate with the Department of Labor, which oversees
the administration of these labor protections, a way to weaken the
implementation of these protections. During those years, the DOT and some
other branches of the federal government were strongly in favor of
privatization of transit. DOT officials argued that the 13(c) labor protections
discourage privatization of transit operations, claiming that they raise the cost
of transit operations, and increase federal subsidies for transit beyond what
they need to be. A major independent survey, however, established that the
13(c) labor protections have not reduced the frequency of local transit agencies
contracting with private companies for services. But the same source claims
that these labor protections do tend to increase the cost of transit operations,
mainly because they give unions significantly greater bargaining power.
Although others may disagree, the authors of the same survey suggest that
federal agencies may encourage privatization of transit services by spending
less time and effort on fighting 13(c) and focusing more on providing technical
assistance, training, and incentives to private vendors of transit services. It
would not only make them more willing to bid on contracts, but it would also
make them more competitive, lower the dollar amounts of their bids, and
increase the quality of their services.72 During the Clinton Administration,
officials in federal agencies significantly lowered their voices on the issue of
privatization. It is almost a dead issue, as far as the federal government is
concerned.73 It certainly is not a dead issue with local governments. Indeed in
many public transit districts, the possibility of privatization is still viewed by
both management and unions as a threat to their survival.
STATES THAT STILL PROHIBIT PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
As we have previously mentioned, there is no federal labor law that governs all
government employees in this country. There is a federal law that governs all
federal employees. The regulation of collective bargaining for state and local
government employees, however, is still left up to the states.
Today, eight states still prohibit public employee collective bargaining. They
72 Michael I. Luger and Harvey A. Goldstein, “Federal Labor Protections and the Privatization
of Public Transit,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp.
229-250.
73
“Feds to Abandon Privatization,” TWU Express, December 31, 1993, p. 3
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are mostly southern states. Sometimes the Memphis Formula, discussed
earlier, enables specially created districts to circumvent these prohibitions,
sometimes not. One leading authority on public sector politics claims that in
most cases these prohibitions are calculated decisions by the states or local
government bodies in order to provide a good business climate by holding
down public employee compensation. Despite these legal prohibitions, some
sort of bilateral decision making between public sector unions and
management still takes place simply because the unions have the power to
force management into some form of collective bargaining.74 In 1989, for
example, bus drivers in the city of Charlotte, North Carolina staged a strike
until their wage demands were met, forcing the city into negotiations through a
federal mediator. Even though North Carolina has by far the strongest statutory
prohibitions of public employee bargaining in the nation, the strike still
occurred. The situation is similar in other southern states that prohibit public
sector collective bargaining. Local jurisdictions in these states have also
conducted informal negotiations with employee groups despite the states’
prohibitions. They have discussed a wide range of issues including wages,
hours, benefits, and other items. They may have even signed some sort of
”Memorandum of Understanding,” which sets forth the terms of their
agreement, without calling it a contract, and carefully avoids anything that
would fly directly into the face of the state s legal prohibition of public sector
collective bargaining.
The lack of formal collective bargaining for public employees in states like
North Carolina, however, has a number of less visible, but nevertheless
important, consequences. First, experts believe that the public organization’s
system of handling conflict with its employees is inadequate. Secondly, the
prohibitions of public employee collective bargaining leads to increasing
privatization of the public services. This, in turn, has a negative effect on
women and minorities, since the public sector has traditionally employed a
larger percentage of these groups, and tends to protect the rights of women and
minorities more than the private sector.75
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
One of the most severe constraints upon transit facilities is legally mandated
drug and alcohol testing of employees in safety-sensitive positions. These
74 Richard C. Kearney (2001), chapter 3.
75 Roger G. Brown and Terrel L. Rhodes, “Public Employee Bargaining Under Prohibitive
Legislation: Some Unanticipated Consequences,” Journal of Collective Negotiations in the
Public Sector, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1991), pp.23-30.
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constraints have far reaching effects on labor relations in transit. They are full
of pitfalls for both union and management. Says Ed Wytkind, Executive
Director of the Transportation Trades Department of the AFL-CIO:
Drug and alcohol testing is another concern. The Teamsters and the
ATU and the TWU and others know all too well that there’s not a
day in a week when one of their members isn’t subjected to some
form of drug testing. Post-accident, pre-employment, return to
service, random −− I don’t care what it is. For the transit industry, it
was an unfunded mandate because it cost a lot of money and the
federal government didn’t finance it, so the public transit systems
have to pay for it.76 union officers, supervisors and managers in the
transit industry who deal with employees in safety-sensitive
positions it is important to be familiar with the government’s
requirements of drug and alcohol testing. While the Amalgamated
Transit Union (ATU) strongly supports safety measures in transit, it
is opposed to random drug and alcohol testing. Indeed, it is random
testing that is the most controversial aspect of this issue, not testing
for just cause.
The Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 requires drug and
alcohol testing not only in transit but also in other transportation industries as
well. They have a bearing on collective bargaining in transit, particularly
grievance handling. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has
published detailed rules that require employers in the transportation industry to
have certain programs in place that control drug and alcohol abuse. These rules
include required procedures for urine drug testing and breath alcohol testing.77
More information on these procedures can be found in Appendix C of this
report.
SUMMARY
The legal environment of transit labor relations is complex and often
confusing, particularly when employees work in the public sector for a transit
authority. Those who work for a private transit firm enjoy the same labor
protections as other private sector employees, including the right to strike.
When private firms are acquired by public transit authorities, those same
employees, who now become public sector employees, lose that right under
76 Ed Wytkind, in Toward a Cooperative Future? Symposium. Norman Mineta International
Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, IISTPS Report 97-2, May 1997, p.68
77 US Department of Transportation Web Index, National Transportation Library, “Drug and
Alcohol Testing: An Overview,” http:www.fhwa.dot.gov/omc/drug_alc/html, June 1996.
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most state laws. Public sector transit labor law is far more complicated than
private sector labor law, and there is no uniformity in the public sector.
Both private and public sector transit organizations generally depend heavily
on federal subsidies. The Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964, as amended,
requires that when private transit firms are acquired by public transit
authorities and want to be eligible for federal subsidies, there must be no
worsening of collective bargaining rights, wages, hours and working
conditions of those employees affected by the transfer of ownership. Section
13(c) of the UMTA also requires that both private and public transit employers
negotiate so-called 13(c) agreements with their unions, which guarantee
employees certain collective bargaining rights and benefits. These agreements
are subject to the approval and control of the U.S. Secretary of Labor. Transit
employers who cannot get their unions to sign off on such an agreement run
the risk of losing their eligibility for federal funding. It is a situation that
significantly strengthens the power of transit unions in this country.
In the case of publicly owned transit organizations, a 13(c) agreement has to
contain certain impasse resolution procedures such as interest arbitration,
mediation, and/or fact-finding. The ATU has favored interest arbitration. For
this and other reasons, interest arbitration is widespread in the transit industry
in this country. In this respect the transit industry, both private and public,
distinguishes itself from the rest of private industry, which generally shuns
interest arbitration.
This does not mean that strikes do not occur in the transit industry. They do, in
both the public and private sector, whether the strike is legal or not. Even the
ATU has a long-standing policy of favoring a strike over interest arbitration
where there is a dispute over union recognition.
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SOME NEGOTIATING BASICS
ANALYZING THE RELATIONSHIP
One of the keys to success as a negotiator is to have realistic expectations of
the other party. That, in turn, requires a realistic perception of the type of
relationship one can expect, or currently has, with the other side. Is it a highly
hostile or highly cooperative relationship, or something in between? The
relationship may or may not be beyond the control of a given negotiator. It
takes two to make a relationship. It is that relationship that determines the
atmosphere of negotiations and the negotiating strategies the parties choose or
fall into. Knowing the relationship helps us plan appropriate strategies and
minimize unpleasant surprises. One of those strategies might be trying to
change the relationship.
In descending order from most to least hostile, negotiating relationships may
be categorized as follows: stonewalling, or lose-lose bargaining; positional or
win-lose ("distributive") bargaining; interest-based or win-win ("integrative")
bargaining; or friendship ("attitudinal") bargaining. Relationships can and do
change, gradually or abruptly. Occasionally the relationship, or at least the tone
of the discussion, changes within the same negotiating session––for better or
worse.
• Stonewalling relationships involve power struggles and extreme conflict
between highly antagonistic parties. The other side is viewed as the
"enemy" who has to be resisted no matter what the issue is. Proposals by
the other side are viewed with extreme suspicion and are cleverly
counteracted. Each side wants to avoid losing ground in the power
struggle, and if possible to gain the upper hand. The participants in the
conflict easily lose sight of the objective of the negotiations. Gaining
power and resisting power becomes the goal, and substantive issues
become irrelevant. In effect, both sides lose when it comes to settling
substantive issues.
• Positional or win-lose bargaining relationships are highly competitive and
basically adversary in nature. They may or may not involve hostile conduct
by the parties. Reluctant compromise is possible. Its most important feature
is that the parties believe that by definition "your gain is my loss," and vice
versa. They engage in what some authors have called "distributive
bargaining." They play a "zero sum" game, which rests on the "fixed pie"
assumption. Whatever one side concedes is assumed to reduce its share of
the pie; little thought is given to working together to enhance the size of the
pie before dividing it up. Little thought is given to the idea that there might
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be many different pies out there, and one side might like one kind of pie but
not care much for another. In win-lose bargaining, each side is concerned
only about its own problems, not the other's. Most contract negotiations
between unions and management today still involve a win-lose attitude
toward each other, at least on the more difficult issues. A more cooperative
relationship may develop when the survival of both sides is threatened.
• Interest-based or win-win relationships are also called "cooperative," or
"problem-focused," "integrative," or "interest-based" bargaining
relationships. Fisher and Ury who wrote the best-known (and very
readable) book on the subject, Getting to Yes,78 call the negotiating style
and strategies involved in this kind of relationship "principled"
negotiations. While there may still be some degree of competition in this
relationship, the parties focus on mutual problem solving. They believe
that both sides can "win" something worthwhile by finding or creating
"trade-offs" or settlement alternatives that will give each side what it needs
the most.
• Friendship bargaining is also called "attitudinal structuring" by some
authors. In this type of relationship, at least one side is more interested in
the relationship than the substantive issues. The main goal of one or both of
the parties is to change the attitude of the parties involved, or maintain a
friendly attitude toward each other.
INTERNAL BARGAINING
What you see and hear at the bargaining table is only the proverbial tip of the
iceberg. Contrary to popular beliefs, across-the-table bargaining is neither the
most crucial nor the most time consuming part of bargaining. "Internal" or
"intra-organizational" bargaining is usually of the utmost importance and
requires time, patience and political savvy. Most parties need to negotiate
internally to achieve unity and plan bargaining objectives and strategies long
before across-the-table negotiations begin. Similarly, negotiating teams on
either side often call "caucuses" or recesses in the midst of across-the-table
bargaining to "regroup.”
PLANNING FOR NEGOTIATIONS
It is safe to say that at least 80 percent of the work in effective negotiations is
away from the bargaining table. Most of this is in the form of pre-negotiation
78 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes, 2nd ed., Penguin Books, 1991. A sequel to
this excellent book is the equally readable paperback by William Ury, Getting Past No, rev.
ed., Bantam Books, 1993.
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activity. The parties need to plan well in advance of actual negotiation with the
other side what it is they want to get out of the negotiations, how they are going
to do it, and who is going to do it. They need to:
• Select a negotiating team and assign roles on the negotiating team. One
such role, of course, is the chief negotiator. While the chief negotiator is
usually selected on the basis of professional expertise, others are often
appointed for different reasons (e.g., political reasons, interpersonal skills,
and prestige).
• They also need to establish their bargaining objectives, interests,
expectations, or outcomes they want to achieve. In recent years, the
objectives of some employers have included "take-backs" or "give-backs"
from the unions they negotiate with. That is to say, employers make
demands for wage reductions and elimination of restrictive work rules to
increase productivity and to meet stiff foreign competition. These "take-
back" oriented negotiations are often called "concessionary bargaining."
They can be political nightmares for union leaders, whose members are
rarely ready to give up benefits won in the past.
• Next they need to prioritize or rank order their expectations or objectives.
For example, a union may decide that its first priority this year is a wage
increase, second is improved medical plan coverage, third is improved
vacation benefits, and so on. A purchasing agent may put an early delivery
date and an extended warranty ahead of purchase price as an expectation in
negotiating a purchase contract.
• Bargaining strategies have to be developed. You and your constituency
may decide to "hang tough" on certain demands you expect to come from
the other side, but be more compromising on others. One of the most
important parts of strategy building in win-win negotiations is to stimulate
creative thinking in the planning sessions to find good trade-offs that take
the "real" interests of the other side into consideration.
• In a traditional, adversarial relationship where positional bargaining
prevails, proposals and counterproposals need to be prepared in advance
so that they can be submitted during negotiations with the other side.
• Proposal development often requires costing out these proposals. It
involves calculating exactly how much a given proposal would cost you or
the other side, and how much alternative proposals would cost.
• "Information is power." In proposal development, or "trade-off planning,"
it helps to have some idea of the demands and expectations of the other
side before actual negotiations begin. In on-going relationships this may
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not be a problem. One knows from experience or "precedent" set elsewhere
what to expect. Sometimes the parties send signals to each other before
negotiations begin (e.g., in press releases, speeches, hints dropped in casual
conversation, "leaking" word to the press or through other channels).
Sometimes it takes at least one preliminary meeting with the other side
before serious trade-off planning can begin.
NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR
In traditional bargaining, there is usually a good deal of showmanship,
posturing, and bluffing at the bargaining table.79 In many respects it resembles
a stage show. Chief negotiators must impress their negotiating team and their
broader constituency in the organization they represent. Particularly in
adversary or competitive relationships, they cannot afford to appear to be
"soft" on the other side, have their loyalty questioned, or cause leading union
members to wonder "whose side are you on anyway?" Militant behavior at the
bargaining table is therefore often staged, and professional negotiators do not
take it personally. In fact, professional negotiators from opposing sides, like
lawyers, can have an amicable relationship away from the bargaining table and
be at each other's throat at the bargaining table, with the understanding that "it's
nothing personal." Frequently a professional negotiator's greatest threat is not
the professional negotiator across the table but some adversary in his own
constituency or a radical novice across the table who hasn't learned to see
things from the other side's perspective or learned how to read "sign language"
yet.
Professional negotiators behave with a purpose in mind. They control their
behavior without being impersonal, and they constantly remind themselves of
the objectives to be reached during negotiations. They keep priorities and
interests in mind. When they represent a client or organization, they swallow
their pride even in the face of insults from the other side, when necessary, and
are constantly aware of their obligations toward their constituency. They do
not take personal attacks personally, and remind themselves "I'm not the
enemy."
Professional negotiators seek to maintain or create a working relationship.
"You don't have to love them, just work with them." Fisher and Brown, in their
book Getting Together: Building Relationships As We Negotiate, offer some
detailed suggestions for building working relationships by being
79 In "interest-based" bargaining, a more recently advocated approach, which is strongly
supported by the U.S. Department of Labor, however, bluffing and posturing is to be avoided.
Instead, the parties emphasize mutual problem solving.
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"unconditionally constructive."80
MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCIES
We have said that what we see and hear at the bargaining table is only the "tip
of the iceberg." The real power holders, the "ratifiers" and "closers of the deal"
may be elsewhere. They may be part of the hierarchy of your own
organization, the other side’s organizational hierarchy, or some third or fourth
"absentee party" to the negotiations. These multiple constituencies raise
negotiations to a higher level of awareness and difficulty. The "diplomat"
negotiator not only keeps his eyes and ears on his own multiple constituencies
and their interests, but also on the multiple constituencies of the party across
the table and their interests.81 They can make or break his chances for reaching
agreement with the other side.
NEGOTIATING POWER
Negotiating power82 is a necessity in all bargaining relationships, only its
expression varies. Both sides have power in any bargaining relationship,
otherwise there would be no use for bargaining. In adversary or highly
competitive relationships it takes more obvious and often more distasteful
forms. Negotiations basically become power plays in adversary or highly
competitive bargaining relationships, where win-lose negotiating styles
prevail. Each side builds up its own power position before across-the-table
negotiations begin so that it comes to the bargaining table with "clout."
Furthermore, each side continually maneuvers to maintain or improve its
power position during negotiation. In the past, most union-management
negotiations, many merger or acquisition negotiations, and international
diplomacy negotiations between adversary nations fell into this category.
The expression of negotiating power is more subtle and more gentle at the
other end of the relationship continuum where win-win (or "interest-based")
bargaining styles prevail. Nevertheless, even in cooperative bargaining
relationships, negotiation power (or "influence") is a necessity.
80Roger Fisher and Scott Brown, Getting Together: Building Relationships As We Negotiate,
Penguin Books, 1988. Another book containing many helpful suggestions on how to negotiate
with difficult people is the very readable paperback by William Ury, Getting Past No, rev. ed.,
Bantam Books, 1993.
81Perhaps the best book on this subject is the paperback by Thomas R. Colosi, On and Off the
Record: Colosi on Negotiation, American Arbitration Association, Kendall/Hunt Publishing
Company, 1993.
82If you don't like the word "power," call it “leverage” or "influence."
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Power is an elusive concept. It comes in many shapes and forms and from
many sources. Particularly in win-win relationships, having something the
other side wants or needs tends to be the most important source of negotiating
power, a control of limited resources. Knowledge or information can mean
power. Planning for negotiations is a way to gather power because it enables us
to come to the bargaining table with knowledge and information the other side
may or may not have. Humor can be power under certain conditions, perhaps
by offsetting the other side's aggression or resistance by creating a congenial
atmosphere that makes it easier for the other side to say yes. Being a potential
threat to the other side, of course, may represent negotiating power also,
although skilled negotiators carefully couch it in positive terms. Unity with and
within your constituency, unity with and within your own negotiating
committee, is power. Not having one's "ducks in a row" tends to undermine a
negotiator's power severely. One of the reasons for internal negotiations,
discussed previously, is to enhance one's negotiating power through unity.
Some writers distinguish between "power" and "influence." A colleague of
ours says: "Power is potential influence, and influence is power in action."
Putting it in another way, there is a difference between possessing power and
exercising it. Some of the most powerful personalities we know rarely exercise
their power. Wise negotiators use power sparingly. They don't "overpower."
Everyone knows they have power, so they need not exercise it. Exercising
power involves costs and risks.
Finally, we must not forget that power is elusive. It has a habit of slipping
away from us. It changes frequently, from one moment to the next, from one
issue to the next, from one response to the next. One side's mistake can literally
change the power balance within minutes.
IMPASSE RESOLUTION
What happens when union and management negotiators reach an impasse
during contract negotiations? In the private sector, it is common to let a strike
by the union or a lockout by the employer settle the matter. In the public sector,
strikes occur, often illegally, because state or federal law may make strikes by
certain public sector employee groups unlawful. When a strike by an
emergency-service sector employee group in the public sector may have
catastrophic effects on public health or safety or welfare, the state may deem it
necessary to pass legislation that makes it mandatory that the employer and the
union of a group of employees make use of compulsory interest arbitration.
A case in point is police and fire fighters.
Interest arbitration differs from grievance or rights arbitration in that it deals
with disputes over the making of a new contract. Grievance or rights
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arbitration, on the other hand, has to do with disputes over the interpretation,
application, or alleged violation of an already existing contract. In any form of
arbitration when union and management reach an impasse, they submit the
dispute to a neutral party for a final and binding decision.
When interest arbitration is required by law, we call it compulsory interest
arbitration. When union and management negotiators have contractually
agreed to use interest arbitration in case of a deadlock of negotiations, we call
it voluntary interest arbitration. Compulsory interest arbitration is a very
controversial dispute settlement technique. Voluntary interest arbitration is not
quite as hotly debated, but it still involves a good deal of controversy.83
Opponents of interest arbitration often talk about its "chilling effect" on the
earlier stages of contract negotiations. They claim that interest arbitration takes
the voluntarism out of the concessions and makes the parties "hold back"
concessions to maneuver the arbitrator into a decision that is more favorable to
their side.
Opponents of interest arbitration also argue that it has a “chilling effect” on the
negotiating parties. They become so dependent or addicted to an outside
arbitrator making the decisions for them that they make a habit of settling by
arbitration.
One attempt to lessen these effects has been the restriction of mandated interest
arbitration in some states only to economic issues. Whether compulsory or
voluntary, one further attempt to reduce the chilling effect of interest
arbitration in the earlier stages of negotiations is the common practice of
limiting the arbitrator's authority through a process called "final-offer"
arbitration (sometimes also called "last-best-offer" arbitration). Under this
form of interest arbitration, each party submits its last, best offer on the
unresolved issues in package form. The arbitrator then has only two choices,
making either the last package offer of the union or the employer the award,
but cannot "split the difference" or decide on some other settlement in
between. The theory behind this arbitration procedure is that both parties to the
deadlocked contract negotiations are provided an incentive to appear as the
most reasonable of the two, and they will make every effort to come forth with
their best possible concession. The parties may even narrow their differences
so much that they might settle among themselves before the arbitrator needs to
make a choice.
83 For the source of the discussion which follows, see: Herbert Oestreich, "Compulsory
Interest Arbitration for Police and Firefighters." California Labor and Employment Law
Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1984, pp. 11-13.
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Despite some of the disadvantages of interest arbitration, voluntary interest
arbitration is quite widespread in the transit industry, but not very common in
other industries. One reason for its widespread acceptance in transit may be
that it is not quite as "voluntary” as its name implies. As we have pointed out in
the chapter on the”Legal Environment of Labor Relations,” there is
tremendous political pressure on both transit unions and management to agree
among themselves to such an interest dispute resolution procedure in their
13(c) agreements. As we have pointed out earlier, transit properties wishing to
be eligible for government funding under the Urban Mass Transit Act must
enter into a 13(c) agreement with their transit unions. The government
guidelines for these 13(c) agreements require some sort of impasse resolution
procedure in case of deadlock in contract negotiations. There is considerable
political pressure on both union and management to adopt the format of a
model 13(c) agreement recommended in 1975 by the influential American
Public Transit Association (APTA). That model agreement favors interest
arbitration. Another reason is the long-standing philosophy of the national
leadership of the ATU that has favored interest arbitration throughout its
history. William D. Mahon, powerful president of the ATU from 1893 to 1946,
did much to spread the use of interest arbitration in the transit industry. He
argued that the public’s dependence on transit compelled the parties to settle
impasses in contract negotiations not by strikes but interest arbitration. As
Darold Barnum, in his landmark study of labor relations in transit pointed out,
that in its very first constitution, as far back as 1892, the ATU declared that its
objective was to encourage the settlement of all disputes between transit
employees and employers by arbitration. But, as Barnum also observes, ATU
locals had trouble carrying out this philosophy, particularly in clearly defining
the issues to be arbitrated and limiting the arbitrator’s authority in rendering a
decision.84 It is because of these and other problems at the local level, that
even today ATU headquarters makes national union representatives available
to ATU locals to assist them in contract negotiations. In many cases, the
national union representative is even the chief union negotiator.
The ATU’s strong preference for interest arbitration is in sharp contrast to that
of its competitor union, the Transportation Workers Union (TWU), which has
traditionally had a stronghold in the New York City and Philadelphia areas.
The TWU has always had an ideological orientation completely opposite of the
ATU. It was originally a leftist organization. Its fiery president Mike Quill,
from the union’s early beginning until his death in 1967, was skillful at
creating crises and turning them to his union’s favor. He managed to get
84Barnum (1977), pp. 50-54.
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favorable settlements by strikes or threats of strikes. He was both feared and
respected for his political power in parts of the country in which his union had
a stronghold. His political influence enabled him to get favorable settlements
for his union even in New York City, a city that until 1954 had consistently
refused to bargain with or sign a binding contract with any union. Still we must
not overestimate the TWU’s influence on voluntary interest arbitration, even in
those days, on the country as a whole. It is safe to say that the ATU’s
philosophy toward interest arbitration has been, and still is far more influential,
if for no other reason than that the ATU has unionized far more transit
properties than the TWU.
The ATU must not be given too much credit for the popularity of voluntary
interest arbitration in transit either, at least not in the public sector. Some credit
has to be given to the inherent political qualities of interest arbitration. It must
be remembered that managers of publicly owned transit properties tend to be
political appointees. They are under pressure to keep transit fares and service
up. They are also under pressure from transit workers and their unions to grant
substantial wage increases. Interest arbitration may give them an easy way out
of this dilemma. If the arbitrator decides in favor of a large wage increase, they
can blame it on the arbitrator rather than appearing soft on the unions.
Similarly, if the union gets only a very modest wage increase in interest
arbitration, they also can save face with their constituency by blaming it on the
arbitrator.85
POST-NEGOTIATION RITUALS
When negotiations are concluded, it is time to engage in certain rituals:
shaking hands, saying "you're tough," congratulating each other for having
reached a settlement, emphasizing that the other side bargained tough but fair,
celebrating and signing with special give-away pens at a peace treaty, making
joint statements to the press, and so on. Wise negotiators look ahead and try to
protect the relationship with the other party, otherwise they may not get them
back to the negotiating table the next time, and more radical conflict ensues.
Wise negotiators do not overkill. They do not celebrate victories, just
settlements. They know that there is no such thing as a "good loser." They
know that the more the other side lost, the greater the need to help bind the
wounds, to heal damaged egos, to humanize inevitable conflict.
85 Barnum (1977), p. 98.
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USING INTEREST-BASED OR WIN-WIN NEGOTIATING
TECHNIQUES TO TURN CONFLICT INTO COOPERATION
Positional bargaining easily leads to a "lose-lose" outcome. Even if it turns out
to be a "win-lose" situation, the chances are that neither side wins it all; both
parties lose at least something. Even if one side appears to have won
considerably more than the other side, it cannot be sure whether only a battle
has been won, but a war is about to be lost. There is no such thing as a "good
loser." Losing hurts. Losing causes resentment. Resentment ruins the
relationship. It is for these reasons that the newer approaches to collective
bargaining in transit call for a completely different attitude and a completely
different approach. It involves a new way of thinking about organizational
culture, competition, and negotiations. It involves a determined willingness to
turn union-management conflict and competition into team spirit and mutual
problem solving -- "I help you with your problems, you help me with mine. I
help you meet your needs and interests, you help me achieve mine." The
technique for doing this is "win-win" or "interest-based" or "principled"
negotiation. It works! It feels strange at first, like all change to new habits
does; but it works, provided both sides make an effort and permanently commit
to them.
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF WIN-WIN OR INTEREST-BASED
NEGOTIATIONS
Four extremely important principles are the foundation of "win-win," or
"interest-based," negotiations to be used for turning conflict into cooperation
and toward mutual problem solving. They are the proven strategies for
reaching agreements toward mutual gains. These principles, which have been
popularized by Fisher and Ury in their famous book Getting to Yes,86 are:
• Separate the people from the problem (or issue)
• Focus on interests, not positions
• Invent options for mutual gain
• Insist on objective criteria
The Principles Explained and Practiced
Separate the people from the problem. Attack the problem, not the people
across the table -- don’t get personal. If the other side attacks you personally,
ignore it, pretend you didn't hear it, keep talking about the issue or problem at
hand, the substance or topic of the negotiations. Stick to business. Know when
86 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes, 2nd ed., Penguin Books, 1991.
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you want to focus on the personal relationship and when to deal with the issue
or problem at hand. For example, if the other side becomes defensive, you
might point out some of the positive things they have said to preserve a good
personal relationship during negotiations. Note: This principle does not
suggest that people are not important. It merely says that people issues should
be kept separate from the others.
Focus on interests, not positions. What problems, real interests does the other
side have that will lead to tradeoffs? What are each side's real interests? Are
they the same? How might one side be able to satisfy the others needs or
interests without giving up too much? Differences in interests very often have
greater potential for reaching agreement than identical interests. A good
example is the parable of the two sisters. A mother overhears her two
daughters quarreling over who gets the only orange left in the house. They
cannot agree and keep on quarreling. Finally the mother has had enough of it
and intervenes, asking the first daughter why she wanted the orange. She
answers, “What a silly question, mother. Of course I want it to eat it.” The
mother asks the second daughter what she wants it for, and she answers, “I
want to bake a cake, mother. I want to grind up the peel and put it into the
cake.” End of story, end of quarrel. It was a feud that could have been avoided
had the two daughters not rushed immediately into defending positions rather
than exploring each other’s interests in the issue. It is crucial, but easier said
than done, to distinguish sharply between the other side's position and their
true interests. Asking why, and asking it more than once, is a good way to
probe for interests, wants, and needs. Probing the other side for their "real"
needs and interests, and analyzing ours, is an indispensable step before we can
move on to the next one: we can invent options for mutual gain.
Invent Options for Mutual Gain. Their problem is our problem too. Generate a
variety of possible solutions or trade-offs that solve both sides’ interests and
needs. Generating creative alternatives is the opposite of fixed pie assumption,
"zero sum game," or "win-lose. "Both sides can perceive a win -- but win with
different things and to solve different problems. What can one side give to the
other that they need that costs us less than it is worth to them?
An example of win-win negotiations is as follows: A landlord needs cash
immediately to pay bills, but the prospective renter of the apartment cannot
move until the first of the month and has the old apartment rent paid up until
the end of month, but has enough money is his checking account and agrees to
pay the first and last month’s rent on the spot. The landlord agrees to "hold" the
apartment for the renter and to count rent from the first of the following month.
The number and kinds of alternatives that can be generated is limited only by
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an individual’s or group’s imagination and creativity. Remember, the most
important source of negotiating power is to have (or create) something the
other side wants or needs. In group situations, a frequently used technique to
generate creative options is brainstorming.
Insist on using objective criteria (standards) for evaluating options. Ask
questions such as: "How did you arrive at that figure?" "Can you give me a
breakdown on the quote you gave me?"
For example, the seller and buyer of a car may agree to the base price
negotiations on the Kelley Bluebook value of car, or the seller and buyer of a
house may negotiate a price on the basis of what similar homes in the
neighborhood with same square footage have sold for during past months
(usually on the computer of real estate firms), or ask for an appraisal by an
outside appraiser. A labor negotiator could insist that a wage increase be based
on industry average or an increase based upon comparison of another company
in the same area or industry. Previously agreed upon standards serve as an
objective measuring stick in evaluating the just generated options in the next
step. Sometimes it may be appropriate to agree on standards for evaluating
options early in the negotiations, particularly where there may be a temptation
to manipulate the standards to fit one's favorite option that has just been
generated. Remember that the standards or criteria for evaluating options have
to be a direct reflection of the needs and interests previously identified.
SUMMARY
These deceptively simple principles are the core of all interest-based
negotiations. The words are simple -- putting them into practice is not.
Participants in interest-based bargaining rarely do well unless they have been
trained by a professional. The process requires great interpersonal skills and,
most of all, a high degree of trust between the parties. And, as most
practitioners soon find out, trust is a very fragile thing. All it takes is a single
action that is perceived by the other side as deliberate deception, and the whole
relationship may be ruined. More about this in the following chapters.
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A WILD GOOSE STORY
When you see wild geese heading south for the winter, flying in V
formation, you might consider what science has discovered as to
why they fly the way they do.
By flying in the V formation, the whole flock adds at least 70
percent greater flying range than if each bird flew alone. As each
bird flaps its wings, it creates an uplift for the bird immediately
behind it.
People who share a common direction and sense of cooperation can
get where they are going more quickly and easily because they are
traveling on the thrust of one another.
When a wild goose falls out of formation, it suddenly feels the drag
and resistance of trying to go it alone, and quickly gets back into
formation to take advantage of the lifting power of the bird in front
of it.
If we had as much sense as a wild goose, we would stay in formation
with those who are heading in the same direction we are.
When the head goose gets tired, it rotates back into the flock, and
another goose flies point.
It makes sense to take turns doing demanding jobs with people or
wild geese.
Geese honk from behind to encourage those up front to keep up their
speed. What do we say when we honk from behind?
Finally, when a wild goose gets sick or is wounded by gunshot, and
falls out of formation, two other geese fall out and follow it down to
lend help and protection. They stay with the fallen goose until it is
able to fly again or until it dies, and only then do they launch out on
their own or with another formation of geese to catch up with their
group.
Why can’t we have more goose sense around here?
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LONG-TERM LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS
HISTORY
Contrary to popular opinion, union-management partnerships are not a new
phenomenon in the United States. One of the authors of this research project
wrote a term paper in the 1950s as an undergraduate student in which he
investigated the early history of union-management cooperation in the United
States.87 He found examples of union-management mutual problem solving
programs in the American clothing industry as early as 1910. In a
revolutionary break with traditional practice, the Amalgamated Ladies
Garment Workers Union assisted several clothing manufacturers in
simplifying the design of new garments that were more appealing to customers
and cheaper to produce, without sacrificing quality. This author found other
noteworthy examples of unions in the 1920s assisting large railroad and small
steel companies in becoming economically viable enterprises again. However,
the author also found that in all of these instances the union-management
cooperative efforts were born out of the need to survive. All of the companies
were on the verge of economic collapse, and the unions were threatened with
loss of jobs for its members, and with it, loss of union members. The
employers’ economic dilemma was a threat to the survival of both union and
company. When the threat to survival was gone, the parties returned to their
previous adversarial relationship. It is an observation that still lingers in this
author’s mind in assessing the long-term prospects on interest-based
negotiations and joint labor-management committees in this country.
These examples, however, were isolated incidents of union-management
partnerships. Hard, adversarial collective bargaining was still the prevailing
labor relations approach in American industry and it continued that way for
many decades. Long laundry lists of proposals, inflated demands to
camouflage the real priorities, threats of strikes or lockouts, bluffing, and
withholding information continued to be a tradition in American union-
management negotiations.
87 Herbert H. Oestreich, “Union-Management Cooperation,” unpublished term paper, Kent
State University, June 3, 1953. The author’s position that union-management cooperative
programs are nothing new has been confirmed by a series or articles published in the early
1990’s by Kathleen B. Sterbenz. See her consecutive article series “The Historical Roots of
Participative Management,” Parts I through IV, in Update (published by the Northeast Ohio
Center for Labor/Management Cooperation), consecutive issues of Spring 1991 through
Spring 1992.
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During the early 1970s, efforts were made in American industry to expand
employee participation in managerial decision making in order to combat the
perceived or real alienation of workers from their repetitive jobs. So-called
Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs, many of them promoted by the
federal government, sprang up and received a good deal of publicity in the
press. Most of the early efforts to expand the popularity of QWL failed. They
ran into strong opposition from organized labor, who viewed these efforts,
often rightfully so, as union avoidance tactics. They frequently also ran into
internal opposition from company managers who viewed QWL as the brain
child of outsiders who knew little or nothing of the “real world” inside the
company. The QWL program experienced a renewal during the 1980s when
threats to their economic survival led both management and union leaders to
explore ways to improve productivity, the quality of products and services, and
to reduce operating costs in the firms.
One example of these relatively narrow QWL efforts was the so-called Quality
Circles (QCs), which for a number of years gained great popularity. Quality
circles are teams of workers appointed by management who typically meet for
a few hours a week with their supervisor to identify and solve specific
problems in production operations or customer service. Some companies
experienced dramatic cost savings through the ingenuity of workers at
relatively low levels in the organization in identifying ways to improve
production processes, eliminate wastes, and enhance customer service. As time
went by, however, QCs became less popular. One reason is that in many
organizations, all too often suggestions by QC members were rejected by
management. In addition, most QC programs were relatively narrow in nature,
keeping them completely separate from collective bargaining. Changes in
work rules, and other matters subject to collective bargaining, were off limits
to the management dominated quality circles. 88 As a result, unions did not
really participate very heavily in the QC movement. As a matter of fact, in the
case of non-union firms, organized labor often suspected that QCs and other
quality of work life programs were designed to keep the unions out.
Today, all that has changed. Where labor-management cooperation has been
successful, the unions are truly equal partners with management in these
efforts. In many labor-management committees today, the successors of the
old QCs, it is impossible to tell which members are management appointed and
which are union appointed.
88 Katz and Kochan (2000), pp. 299-303
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FROM INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATIONS TO JOINT LABOR-
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
Today, long-term labor-management partnerships, which emphasize mutual
problem solving rather than traditional adversarial confrontation patterns,
basically take two forms. Often the parties first try interest-based negotiation
(IBN), then add one or more labor-management committees (LMCs) if IBN
was successful. In other cases, the parties first try a modest cooperative
program by forming one or more labor-management committees, which are
basically problem-solving teams, and they may add interest-based negotiations
later. In still other cases they launch the two simultaneously. Both IBN and
LMCs require a high level of trust between union and management
representatives, a change in organizational culture in both the employer and
union organization, open communication, and a high degree of information
sharing. As we shall see later, those are giant steps for both union and
management to undertake.
INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATIONS
Interest-based negotiations (IBN), already discussed in the chapter entitled
“Some Negotiating Basics,” is basically the same as what is popularly called
"win-win” negotiations or bargaining. It is also called “principled
negotiations” because the techniques follow these principles:
• Attack the issue, not the people
• Focus on interests, not positions
• Invent options for mutual gain
• Evaluate options by agreed-upon criteria
The authors also believe that union and management negotiators should agree
beforehand that any attempt at interest-based bargaining should be regarded as
an experiment that either side may abandon at any time and return to the
previous bargaining relationship without adverse consequences.
JOINT LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
LMCs are basically union-management problem solving teams. They are
similar in some ways to the old QCs, but differ in the degree of union
participation in the establishment and control of these teams, as well as the
scope of tasks they are allowed to tackle. They either deal with one specific
problem only, or they may be continuous improvement teams. It is essential
that they are created and maintained with equal union participation. There are
risks to making those teams merely an arm of management at the exclusion of
the union. If the union does not exercise equal control of these teams, surely
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the union membership is going to rebel against union leaders for going soft on
management.
It is also essential that LMCs not be allowed deal with issues that are subject to
collective bargaining, unless specifically authorized by the union-management
contract negotiating team to do so. Otherwise, it would not only undermine the
contract negotiating team, it would also create the legal risk of the union losing
its right to exclusive representation and losing the protections of the National
Labor Relations Act.
TRANSIT-SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
PARTNERSHIPS
A few years ago, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich appointed a task
force to examine labor-management collaboration in state and local
governments. The task force studied in-depth nearly 50 different locations
across the U.S. Some of the sites included transit operations controlled by local
transit authorities. A 1996 publication of a report of this task force contains
these findings about labor-management cooperation in the public sector:89
• State and local government must transform service and the way the public
workplace is managed. Traditional methods of delivery service,
administration of personnel, styles of supervision communication, and
approaches to collective bargaining are no longer sufficient.
• There is a need to lower the confrontational rhetoric by elected officials,
managers, and union leaders and to have everybody focus on common
tasks and goals.
• Focusing on service to the public with increased employee participation
can reduce confrontation in collective bargaining relationships that have a
history of conflict.
The potential for labor-management cooperation in public service is greater
than commonly recognized, perhaps even greater than in the private sector.
Below are some transit-specific examples of successful labor-management
partnerships.
City of Peoria, Illinois
Steadily rising health plan costs are familiar budget busters in both private and
public sector organizations. It is a collective bargaining issue that has defied
89 US Department of Labor, Working Together for Public Service, Report of the US Secretary
of Labor’s Task Force on Excellence in State and Local Government Through Labor-
Management Cooperation. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor, May 1996, pp. 3-4.
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solution by the most imaginative and experienced negotiators. The city of
Peoria, Illinois was no exception. The city s employee health plan cost for a
wide variety of employee groups, including transit employees, was increasing
between 9 to 14 percent every year while the city s revenues were going down.
There seemed to be no end to the dilemma. Nobody cherished the idea of
reducing employees health care benefits, asking employees to accept higher
deductibles, or share the increased premium cost. In 1993, with the approval of
its unions, Peoria took the health care issue off the bargaining table, and
formed a complex Labor-Management Committee with representatives of its
eight unions, including the transit union, and eight representatives of its
administration. It was a wise move. It is generally not recommended that
unions and management who want to try interest-based bargaining start with
such a difficult and usually hard-fought issue at the bargaining table.
The city of Peoria by-passed that issue at the negotiating table, and instead
submitted it to a Joint Labor-Management Committee (JLMC) that had more
flexibility and no agreement deadline to meet. The committee went to work
and designed a more competitive health plan bidding procedure with the help
of some outside consultants, improved the provider selection process, took a
close look at what kind of health care employees really needed and wanted,
and finally came up with a tailor-made health care package. That year the city s
employee health plan was expected to cost about $6 million. The joint-labor
management committee came up with a plan that cost only $4.8 million, saving
the city $1.2 million and resulting in greater employee satisfaction with the
health plan than before. In previous years, the parties always deadlocked over
the health plan issue at the bargaining table and had to settle the impasse in
arbitration. That year, in 1994, they settled the issue without arbitration, and
have not gone to arbitration since. They continue their efforts to improve and
economize their health care package.90
Metra Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation
One of the most impressive successes in maintaining long-term union-
management collaboration, and the lessons to be learned from it, can be found
in the example of the Metra Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation in the
Chicago metropolitan area. The corporation is one of the divisions of the
Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), which serves the transit need of the
greater Chicago metropolitan area. The RTA was created by the State of
Illinois in 1982. Its Metra division is responsible for all commuter rail service
in the six-county metropolitan Chicago area. After its formation, Metra
acquired several private carriers that were no longer financially solvent. Over
90 Working Together for Public Service (1996), pp. 16-17
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time, however, some of Metra’s passenger services have been subcontracted
again to private carriers, which employ approximately 2,000 workers engaged
in commuter rail services. There are roughly 2,300 additional employees in the
transit services directly operated by Metra itself. Metra directly negotiates with
15 different unions, and has 19 different collective bargaining agreements.91
Relatively early in its union-management history, Metra proposed the
formation of a Joint Labor Management Committee (JLMC) to end the
traditional, adversarial union-management relationship of its predecessors and
to create a new labor-management partnership. The Metra history of union-
management collaboration once again supports our firm conclusion that more
often than not, interest-based bargaining and subsequent mutual problem
solving efforts are born out of a need for survival by one or both of the parties.
In the case of Metra, employees were grateful to have a job following the
bankruptcies of their previous employers. Metra’s successful history of union-
management collaboration demonstrates another frequently observed success
factor when an organization with a hostile relationship with its unions fails
and is acquired by another organization and a new management, there is an
absence of historic baggage in the relationship of the old unions and the new
management. The unions, which represent the same employees as before, are
more willing to take a fresh look at their collective bargaining relationship with
the new management. In the case of Metra, the management of the new
organization almost immediately committed itself to giving its unions and
union employees a voice in its decision-making processes. It created in 1983
what is believed to be the first Labor-Management Committee in the commuter
rail industry in this country.92
What is interesting to note is that Metra started interest-based bargaining and
the formation of a Labor-Management Committee (problem-solving team) all
at about the same time. The success of both underscores our point that there is
no rule of thumb as to which ought to come first, and there is no reason to
believe they cannot be started at about the same time. Metra, however, was
very careful to remain neutral when it came to selecting union representatives
to serve on the Labor-Management Committee. It left that job to the Railway
Labor Executives Association (RLEA), an association of the heads of the
various railroad unions in the area. Another precaution was that the Labor-
Management Committee could not deal with any issues that were subject to
collective bargaining. Furthermore, the committee first started to work on
91 Mercer Management Consulting (1997), p. A4-3.
92 Mercer Management Consulting (1997), p. A4-4.
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relatively small problems, on issues that were relatively non-controversial, like
employee safety, employee assistance programs, prevention of drug and
alcohol abuse, and technical skills training. Later on, Metra and its union
leaders created an additional steering committee, which was placed in charge
of coordinating and guiding the many individual task forces or problem
solving teams that were formed. During all of this, Metra emphasized training
and workforce education for all those who worked on problem solving teams
or the negotiating committee. In addition, Metra and its unions hired
independent outside consultants to help guide their efforts in gradually forming
a permanent labor-management partnership. It is interesting to note that Metra
had no particular design for its labor-management partnership. Instead it chose
to let the new cooperative union-management relationship evolve naturally
and gradually. Nor did Metra try to measure productivity improvements as a
result of this new partnership because it did not want its unions to become
defensive over these measurements. The overall effect of all this was a
decentralization of decision making at Metra, a flattening of the organization
chart, and a solid continued labor-management partnership for many years.
Both union leaders and management at Metra believe their success has been
due to the following factors:93
• Careful selection of the original union representatives of the first Labor-
Management Committee. All were high-ranking union officers with an
excellent understanding of union objectives and decisions to be made to
translate goals into action. They also knew how to interact well with senior
level managers.
• Keen interest and participation of top management in the activities of the
Labor-Management Committee. That interest was clearly communicated to
all management personnel.
• Clear and unqualified support from the Metra Board of Directors
throughout the program.
• Buy-in from all the unions at the highest level.
• Started small and moved slowly to build trust. Started with projects that
had a high probability of success.
• Included a customer service perspective in all of their projects.
• Included middle management in the program. Empowered middle
managers to implement agreed-upon improvements.
93 Mercer Management Consulting (1997), pp. A4-6.
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• Open and honest sharing of information with union representatives
• Constant communication with all the parties involved.
• Mutual respect.
• Long-term perspective.
• Quickly dealt with early warning signs of potential conflict.
In our opinion, this list should have included recognition of the contributions
of the outside consultants to the success of this partnership, particularly in the
early stages. Our observations lead us to conclude that training by outside
consultants in the early stages of such a program to make the participants
understand the process and techniques involved are absolutely crucial
ingredients for success.
In addition we would like to note that the success factors at Metra closely
matches those found in the studies of other organizations, as well our own
information obtained in personal interviews with a large variety of labor
relations practitioners in the transit industry.
The Jennings Survey
In the early 1980s, Kenneth Jennings, Jay Smith, and Earle Traynham did a
landmark study of union-management cooperation in the transit industry.94
They surveyed in depth seven different transit properties. They conducted 67
on-site interviews of transit practitioners: general managers, managers of
personnel/labor relations, transportation managers, maintenance managers,
assistants to these managers, line supervisors, union representatives and third-
party neutrals.
Based on this survey and a review of the literature, the authors concluded that
in mass transit, these conditions contribute heavily toward success or failure of
union-management cooperative programs: 95
• Thorough training of participants in the program.
• Early successes are important. Therefore, it is important to take on easy
problems or issues first, leave the tough ones for later on.
• At the beginning, go for tangible, visible results on clearly defined issues.
• Union leaders must be secure with their membership in participating in
94 Kenneth M. Jennings, and others, Labor-Management Cooperation in a Public Service
Industry. New York: Praeger, 1986.
95 Jennings (1986), pp. 124-126.
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cooperative efforts.
• Take into account demographic differences between different localities and
employee groups who participate in these efforts. For example, older
employees may be more willing to sacrifice income for job security.
Regarding the measurement of productivity gains from labor-management
partnerships, the authors observed that there is frequently a reluctance or
outright objection to using statistical measures to assess the success or failure
of such programs. The authors point out that some years ago a survey of 99
labor-management situations in the private and 30 in the public sector found
that precise numbers were used in only about 10 percent of the situations (25
out of 245). The authors believe that there are at least four good reasons for this
reluctance to quantify productivity improvements: 96
• Success or failure of labor-management partnership efforts may be due to
external factors beyond the control of the participants employees, such as
scarcity of spare parts, raw material, supplies, machines and equipment.
Too many variables determine the outcome of change. For example,
increased output may be little more than the tendency of employees to
work harder when under the spotlight of attention ( Hawthorne effect ).
Similarly a threat of a plant closing can do wonders for productivity. Cause
and effect may be difficult to establish. For example, reduced employee
turnover may be due more to poor economic conditions than LMC efforts.
• Facts and figures necessary to measure improvements accurately may not
be available. Employees may not be accustomed to supplying those figures
at the bargaining table or in an LMC meeting.
• The quantitative results of a labor-management partnership may be
interpreted by some people in a negative light. For example, a reduction of
grievances may be interpreted as supervisors becoming lax in enforcing
discipline.
• There is a danger of overemphasis on short-term results -- to look good on
the balance sheet, when the outlook in any labor-management partnership
should be long-range. There are many valuable but vaguely defined
benefits of union-management cooperative efforts that cannot be accurately
measured, such as improvement in quality of worklife, employee morale,
customer satisfaction, etc.
96 Jennings (1986), pp. 107-110. See also Barnum (1977), pp. 158-160, who discusses in detail
the flaws in measuring driver productivity.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
LESSONS LEARNED FROM HISTORY
We believe we have learned, or should have learned, some important lessons
from two big strikes by the Amalgamated Transit Union against Greyhound
Bus Lines. Even though Greyhound is not a “transit” company by our
definition, the Greyhound strikes had a far-reaching impact on labor relations
in the entire transit industry. A seven-week strike occurred in 1983, and
another ensued in 1990, which ended more than three years later. Both made
history; both had devastating consequences to both the union and the company.
We have found that the Greyhound strikes directly contributed to the
realization of some practitioners in the transit industry that strikes of this
magnitude can ruin both union and transit company. As a result they have
shown a greater willingness to engage in interest-based bargaining, and greater
union-management cooperation in mutual problem solving.
Transit managers have learned that poor union-management relations
negatively affect marketing and profits of transit organizations, whether
private or public. They are lessons learned not only from the Greyhound
strikes, but strikes in the airline industry as well, particularly those experienced
by Eastern Airlines.
The combined experience of the Greyhound, Eastern Airline, and other major
strikes, we believe, hold the following specific lessons for the transit industry:
• Destructive labor relations adversely affect a transit organization’s
financial and marketing position, which can only be reversed by the parties
themselves, not by government intervention.
• Management must be proactive in its dealings with union officials if it
wants to reverse hostile labor relations. It cannot wait for the union to make
the first move toward a more conciliatory approach.
• A striker replacement policy creates horrendous legal problems, and legal
problems have a habit of dragging on and on.
• A weak and fragmented union typically offers more disadvantages than
advantages for management. A weak union cannot facilitate the collective
bargaining process for two reasons. First, union officers, when faced with
this situation, typically spend most of their time and energies quelling
political rivals and appeasing the various factions within the union.
Secondly, while negotiating, management cannot be sure that union
negotiators really speak for the union membership. Agreements reached
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with union leaders at the bargaining table will easily unravel when a
competing faction within the union convinces the membership that the
proposals are not in their best interests.
POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF STRIKES AND STRIKE THREATS
Employees in privately owned transit organizations have the same legal right
to strike as other private-sector employees. Employees of publicly owned
transit organizations, with few exceptions, do not have a legal right to strike,
because of state legislation banning the strike for state and local government
employees. In practice, they occasionally strike anyhow.
A strike, or threat of strike, plays a strong political role in the transit
environment, much more so than in most other industries. We have explored
the less obvious role which a strike, or threat of a strike, plays in the collective
bargaining process in the transit industry.
INTEREST ARBITRATION
Interest arbitration differs from grievance or rights arbitration in that it deals
with disputes over the making of a new contract. Grievance or rights
arbitration, on the other hand, has to do with disputes over the interpretation,
application, or alleged violation of an already existing contract. In new
contract negotiations, when union and management reach an impasse, they
submit the dispute to a neutral party for a final, binding decision, and call it
interest arbitration.
Although not very common in other industries, interest arbitration is widely
used in the transit industry, both in the public and private sector. We have
explained the reasons for the widespread acceptance of interest arbitration in
transit, and how it specifically impacts the collective bargaining process.
SUCCESS FACTORS IN LONG-TERM LABOR-MANAGEMENT
PARTNERSHIPS
Threat to Survival
The authors have come to the firm conclusion that union-management
cooperative efforts are most likely to succeed when both parties’ survival is at
stake, particularly in the early stages of their labor-management partnership.
The threat to survival may be economic, or it may be political.
When the transit employer is on the verge of economic collapse, its unions are
also threatened with loss of jobs for its members. In this situation, both union
and management have a powerful motive for cooperating with each other to
get the transit organization back on its financial feet again and to remove that
common economic threat.
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But the threat to survival may also be political. A publicly owned transit
organization may be threatened with privatization. Managers are threatened
with loss of jobs, and union leaders are threatened with the loss union
recognition by the new private enterprise, or at least a less favorable bargaining
position with the new enterprise. In this case, both union and management may
decide to cooperate with each other in trying to influence political bodies or
political appointees to abandon their thoughts of privatization. There have been
examples of political threats to survival on a much more individual level, and
general managers of transit organizations have come under close scrutiny and
criticism by influential members of a transit board for their approach to labor
relations. The result was that the general manager decided to try an interest-
based bargaining approach that succeeded.
In our study we found the threat to survival to be such a pervasive motivator
for transit unions and transit management to begin a new, more cooperative
collective bargaining relationship, that we feel its importance as a success
factor in forming the new relationship cannot be overstated.
Visionaries and Role Models at the Top
Effective long-term union-management collaboration always requires
visionaries and role models at the top of their organizations. Those who have
studied successful large-scale innovation in organizations have found that
vision and visionary leadership at the top of the organization are more
important than decision making skills.97 In the transit industry, in our opinion,
the most important visionary and role model is the general manager. In our
interviews for this publication, investigators found numerous examples of
interest-based bargaining or other forms of union-management collaboration
failed because the general manager just did not “walk the talk.” In some cases,
he or she simply delegated the task of establishing an interest-based bargaining
relationship or a Joint Labor-Management Committee (JLMC) to someone else
in the organization and lost credibility. Here is an example of one middle
manager’s reaction when asked about the general manager’s attitude toward
interest-based bargaining:
You know, Herb, general managers come and go. They all talk a big
line when they first come here. Most of us just sit back and wait and
see, see whether they really mean it. The one we have now doesn’t.
It’s just talk. And the union knows it too. They don’t take him
seriously either.
97Claudia Bird Schoonhoven and Mariann Jelinek, “The Innovation Marathon: Living in
Turbulent Times,” Northern California Executive Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall 1990, p. 21.
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The Paradox of Initiating Bottom-Up Changes from the Top Down
Few labor relations scholars and practitioners will disagree with the claim that
top management must be the strong visionaries and innovators in transforming
union-management relations from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship.
Although easier said than done, the notion seems obvious. What seems less
obvious, perhaps even paradoxical, is our claim that the very same people who
created a change of thinking at the top of the organization must also initiate a
change of thinking among the lower levels of the organization. Effective
mutual problem solving between union and management requires problem
solvers and change agents among the rank and file of the organization, the
people who are closest to the jobs. Rather than imposing such changes from the
top, the highest echelons of management must find ways of inspiring and
empowering the lower echelons of the organization to initiate these changes.98
It is the people whose jobs are closest to problems that are in the best position
to find the most creative and sensible solutions. When they are successful in
doing so, the visionaries at the top of the organization, both management and
union, have succeeded in deliberately turning a “top-down organization” into a
“bottom-up organization,” a requirement for a successful long-term labor-
management partnership. It is also this kind of organization in which teamwork
through employee empowerment flourishes. But we must not forget to involve
the middle management levels in these efforts either. Middle managers also
must be trained and encouraged to become facilitators rather than bosses.
Chances are that much of the initial resistance, in overtly or disguised form,
comes from the middle management levels of the organization. They often feel
that their loss of personal control is too big a price to pay for the chance that a
risky experiment might pay off. And unless management involves its unions as
completely equal partners in these participative programs, they are bound to
suffer the same fate as quality circles did some years ago.
The Role of Outside Consultants and Trainers
In our opinion, outside consultants and trainers are an indispensable ingredient
for success. We believe it would be unwise to try interest-based bargaining or
start joint labor-management committees without first having direct
participants involved in the process receive training from an outside consultant
or government mediator.99 Those involved in either interest-based bargaining
or joint labor-management committees need training in interest-based
bargaining philosophy and techniques. It is usually during these initial training
98 Anne T. Lawrence and David A. Weckler, “Turning Frogs into Princes: Transforming Other
Companies into NUMMI’s Image,” Northern California Executive Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall
1990, pp. 2-3.
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sessions that skillful consultants manage to establish trust in the process and in
each other. Labor-management committee members need additional training
on problem solving and decision-making skills, cost-benefit analysis, and team
building.
“Looping Out”
Successful interest-based bargaining requires steady trust, not only between
the negotiators at the bargaining table, but also on the part of the constituencies
the negotiators represent. in order to preserve the trust of their constituencies in
the interest-based bargaining process, the negotiators must periodically “loop
out.” They have to take time out from across-the-table negotiations, go back to
their constituencies, inform them of what is going on, and renew their trust in
what they, the negotiators, are doing. if they fail do so, they run the risk of
losing the support of their constituencies.
WORDS OF CAUTION
Conflict over Differences of Interests Remain
Union-management cooperation and successful interest-based bargaining does
not mean an end to conflict between union and management. There will always
be differences in interest to be ironed out and to be compromised. Emotions
may run high when neither side wants to give up its own interests. Conflicts are
inevitable. They are normal, and do not necessarily mean the end of interest-
based bargaining. As Dr. Stephen Van Beek said at a conference sponsored by
the Mineta Transportation Institute at San José State University:100
When we talk about cooperation, I think it's always important to
keep in mind that there are some differences that can be split and
there are some compromises that can be made, but there's always
going to be a degree of conflict between labor, management, and
other organizations. Nobody is going to go to the table and give
everything up in order to have cooperation. There are distinct
interests and those distinct interests are going to make themselves
known. It’s unrealistic to expect that cooperation will mean no
99 The Feral Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) has developed excellent training
programs for these purpose and has experienced facilitators on its staff to train and advise
union and management organizations on these matters. More information can be obtained from
any regional office of the FMCS or by contacting FMC headquarters in Washington, DC, at
(202) 606-5445.
100 Stephen Van Beek, Toward a Cooperative Future? Symposium. Norman Mineta
International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, IISTPS Report 97-2, May
1997, pp. 9-10.
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argument or no conflict. We are therefore not talking about ending
all conflict. But what we are talking about is getting people at the
same who then can, where they can. To articulate the need for
transportation spending and not get into some kind of silly
arguments between labor and management that weakens
everybody’s position before legislatures and regulators.
Conflicts over differences of interests are bound to become more
intense in the latter stages of interest-based bargaining, when the
parties tackle the economic issues. The parties may actually return
to the “fixed pie” mentality and adversarial bargaining over how to
split the financial gains which mutual problem solving efforts have
brought the employer. The best case scenario is that this change in
attitude and bargaining style is only temporary. The worst case
scenario is that the trust is gone, and one or both sides decide to
return permanently to the old adversarial style of collective
bargaining.
Expect Failures
Ira Lobel is a mediator of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, with
a wealth of experience in helping union and management negotiating
committees overcome apparently irreconcilable conflicts in interest-based
negotiations. He has done his best to debunk the romantic notion that an
interest-based bargaining is a panacea for all union-management problems.101
We basically agree, but we have also noted instances in which the parties
abandoned interest-based bargaining and mutual problem solving because of
unresolved differences in interests and a resurgence of distrust, only to get
back to the partnership when the time seemed right again. The most
spectacular example in this respect took place with the Utah Transit Authority.
While the labor-management partnership there achieved some remarkable
successes, there came a time when the union-management relationship
deteriorated so much that the labor-management partnership was all but
abandoned. On the management side, there emerged the feeling that partnering
was too focused on the union, and a one-way street. They felt that the union
was only interested in itself and could care less about management’s problems.
As one voice on the management side put it: “How can you partner with
someone who’s only looking out for themselves? As partnering goes up,
quality goes down.”
101 Ira B. Lobel, “Is Interest-Base Bargaining Really New?” Dispute Resolution Journal, Vol.
55, No 1, February 2000, pp. 8-17.
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On the union side there were many people who felt that managers were
obstructing the partnering efforts and would never change. This is one quote
from the union’s point of view: “It used to be that they at least acted like they
wanted to work with us; now that kind of effort is gone. It’s back to the ‘I’m
the boss and don’t forget it.’”102
The first contract negotiated by union and management in the interest-based
bargaining environment was voted down by 70 percent of the local union
membership. The local union leadership came close to being voted out of
office. An important lesson the management side learned from this was that it
had not adequately considered the perceptions and expectations of the union
leaders’ constituency. It worked more closely with the union on
communicating the second contract package that was negotiated in interest-
based bargaining, and it was accepted by the union membership.
Times of increased conflict and periodic breakdowns in the relationship do not
mean that a long-term labor-management partnership is not possible. Ups and
downs are normal, even though they may be difficult to take. One transit labor
relations director said, “I wonder why sometimes interest-based bargaining
looks and feels so great, and at other times it’s utter frustration.”
Measuring Productivity Improvements
Trying to assess the success or failure of labor-management partnerships by
using statistical measures of increases or decreases of employee productivity is
a risky business. There are often too many factors beyond the control of the
participants in the transit system that cause productivity to rise or fall. For
example, in trying to measure the productivity of vehicle maintenance
employees, such external factors as scarcity of spare parts or raw materials and
availability of modern machines and equipment may distort the figures. For
drivers, such measures as number of passengers moved or passenger miles
driven per employee suffer from the fact that they are more influenced by the
riders than the drivers, by peak and off-peak ridership, by traffic congestion,
and other factors. There is a justified mistrust of the numbers by the unions
representing these employees in the organization, and that mistrust may
negatively affect other aspects of the trust between unions and management
that is so badly needed in a successful labor-management partnership.
There are also socio-psychological factors justifying that mistrust of the
numbers. For example, increased output may be little more than the tendency
102 From an interview with Jerry Benson, Human Resource Director, Utah Transit Authority,
March 27, 2000, and a presentation by Jerry Benson, Lorin Simpson, and Kim Ulibarri at the
National Transit Institute Transit Trainers’ Workshop, Portland, Oregon, March 27, 2000.
Summary and Conclusions
Mineta Transportation Institute
86
of employees working harder when under the spotlight of attention
(“Hawthorne Effect”). The state of the economy may be a factor also. A threat
of elimination of certain transit services for economic reasons can increase
productivity. Reduced employee turnover may be due more to poor economic
conditions than union-management partnership efforts. In using productivity
measures, there is also a danger of overemphasis on short-term results in order
to look good on the balance sheet, when the outlook in any labor-management
partnership ought to be very long-range.
There are many valuable but vaguely defined benefits of union-management
cooperative efforts that cannot be accurately measured, such as improvement
of quality of worklife, employee morale, customer satisfaction, employee
loyalty, employee sense of ownership of their jobs, and many others. It is no
wonder that labor unions are often defensive about productivity measurements
being used to assess the success or failure of union-management cooperative
efforts, particularly in the early phases of their new relationship. Their
cooperation may be at risk.
Expecting Too Much Too Soon
A labor-management partnership that lasts requires profound changes in
organizational culture in both the management and union organization. Such
change comes slowly. It requires a patience that the practitioners or their
constituencies often do not have. As a result, the confidence in the process and
the trust in each other are not given a chance to evolve slowly and naturally.
Trying to address the big issues and the big problems early in the relationship
usually means trouble. With few exceptions, those who report success in their
labor-management partnership also report that they started small. They started
with the easy, less controversial issues in interest-based contract negotiations
and with the easier problems in joint labor management committee meetings,
and left the tougher ones for a later day. They allowed success to breed
success.
The Spirit is More Important than the Procedures
It is our observation that many a good start toward interest-based bargaining,
joint labor-management committees, and programs of positive discipline in the
transit industry has been ruined by a preoccupation with written rules and
procedures. Bureaucratic procedures often ruin a good thing by drawing up
rules and regulations that are created to make a good thing better, by trying to
make sure that a few isolated individuals don’t take advantage of a good thing.
So pages and pages of bureaucratic procedures are created that are completely
opposite of the spirit of goodwill that interest-based bargaining embraces.
The reader may recall the opposite example of the Metra Regional Commuter
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Railroad Company (Metra), mentioned previously. Metra had no particular
design or written procedures for its labor-management partnership. Instead,
Metra let the new cooperative union-management relationship “evolve”
naturally and gradually, becoming an eminently successful relationship. The
spirit of trust and openness in union-management cooperative efforts are more
important than the procedures.
GRIEVANCE DISPUTES
What affect does a long-term labor-management partnership have on grievance
disputes? In our opinion, the evidence is inconclusive, even though
interviewees and conference speakers often claim that interest-based
bargaining and joint labor-management committees have dramatically reduced
the number of grievances filed in their transit organizations. Our opinion is
supported by a landmark study in the early 1980s of seven selected transit
properties with experience in long-term labor-management partnerships.103 In
this study, Kenneth Jennings and his research colleagues point out that the
reduction of the number of grievances may be due to many factors that have
nothing to do with the success of a labor-management partnership. For
example, in the new organizational culture of a labor-management partnership,
there may be strong pressures on supervisors to be more lenient in disciplining
employees than before. Our own interviews suggest that two gradual changes
in the handling of grievances tend to take place in the evolution of a long-term
labor-management partnership. First, in the long-term-labor-management
partnership there tends to be a natural drift toward a “discipline without
punishment” approach, which would drastically reduce or even eliminate
grievances filed by employees. 104 Secondly, we found that in many cases,
joint-labor management committees, in their problem-solving efforts, address
employee concerns before they become formal grievances.
OTHER SUMMARY POINTS
Additional summary points can be found in Appendix A through C. In
Appendix A, there are checklist type of reminders and recommendations for
those readers who plan to become involved in interest-based bargaining. In
Appendix B there is a summary of hints for those who plan to be involved with
joint labor-management problem solving committees. Appendix C contains a
summary of government regulation of drug and alcohol testing in the transit
industry.
103 Jennings (1986), p. 109.
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104 In the “Discipline Without Punishment Approach,” often called “Positive Discipline,”
emphasis on counseling and an employee's voluntary commitment to help solve the
performance or behavior problem. In the first step of this discipline procedure, there usually is
only casual and completely non-threatening counseling by the immediate supervisor. The
supervisor seeks to explore the reasons for the employee’s problem, make him or her realize
that rules and standards are merely "business necessities," and nothing personal. Without
threat, the supervisor seeks voluntary commitment from the employee to help correct the
problem. No official record of the fist step of this procedure is placed in the employee’s
personnel file. If the employee’s unacceptable performance or behavior continues, in the
second step of this disciplinary procedure, more serious counseling takes place and the
employee is given a written reminder to the employee that he/she of promised to correct the
problem. In the counseling session of this step, without threat of discipline, A specific action
plan agreed upon, to be regarded as a "psychological contract." A written summary of the
agreed upon action plan is placed in the employee’s official personnel file.If the employee’s
problem still continues, in the third step, the employee is placed on a one-day paid "decision
making leave" (DML) to "think it over" -- whether he/she wants to keep the job or resign. If the
employee, upon return for the leave, decides to stay, In the fourth step specific goals, specific
actions, specific timetables area greed upon and put in writing. The employee agrees in writing
that discharge is automatic if the problem continues or occurs again. There is a 22-minute
video available which demonstrates this process: It is called “Discipline Without Punishment,”
and is published by CRM Films, telephone 800-421-0833.
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GLOSSARY OF
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS
Term Definition
13(c) Section 13(c), the labor protection provisions of theUrban Mass Transit Act of 1964, as amended
AAA American Arbitration Association
AC Transit Alameda-Contra Costa Counties Transit, California
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution (Alternative to resolutionby the courts, such as mediation and arbitration)
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor – Congress of IndustrialOrganizations
AFSCME American Federation of State, County and MunicipalEmployees, AFL-CIO
APTA American Public Transportation Association (formerlyAmerican Public Transit Association)
ATU Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit System (San Francisco BayArea)
BNA Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (Publisher of labor
relations reference work)
Caltrans California Department of Transportation
CPUC California Public Utility Commission
CTC California Transportation Commission
CTP California Transportation Plan
CWA Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO
DOL U.S. Department of Labor
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DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMC Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
FTA Federal Transit Administration. May also stand forFederal Transit Act of 1991, as amended
IAM & AW International Association of Machinists and AerospaceWorkers, AFL-CIO
IBB Interest-Based Bargaining (same as IBN)
IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO
IBN Interest-Based Negotiations (same as IBB)
IBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO
IBU Ferryboatmen’s Union
IISTPS International Institute for Surface Transportation PolicyStudies (now called the Mineta Transportation Institute)
ILWU International Longshore and Warehouse Union, AFL-CIO
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of1991
IUE International Union of Electronic, Electrical Workers,AFL-CIO
JLMC Joint Labor-Management Committee (same as LMC)
LMC Labor-Management Committee (same as JLMC)
LMPC Labor-Management Partnership Committee (same asLMC or JLMC)
LMRA Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (also calledTaft-Hartley Act)
Term Definition
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Med-Arb
Mediation-Arbitration (If mediation fails, it must be
followed by final and binding arbitration by a third-party
neutral)
NCEC
Non-Contract Employee Committee (a union of
professional, administrative employees in the
Sacramento Regional Transit Authority)
NIRA National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (declared
unconstitutional, replaced by the NLRA)
NLRA National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
NTI National Transit Institute
RTA Regional Transit Authority
SEIU Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO
SIU Seafarers’ International Union
TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program (of theTransportation Research Board)
TCU Transportation Communications International Union,AFL-CIO
TRB Transportation Research Board
TWU Transportation Workers Union, AFL-CIO
UMTA
Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964, as amended.
Redesignated as the Federal Transit Act in 1991. (Note:
“UMTA” can also stand for the former “Urban Mass
Transit Administration”)
UTU United Transportation Workers Union, AFL-CIO
VTA Valley Transportation Authority of Santa Clara Valley,California
Term Definition
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APPENDIXA
INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING GUIDELINES
(Note: Many of the items mentioned in Appendix A also apply to the guide for
LMCs in Appendix B)
OTHER NAMES FOR INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING
• Interest-based Negotiations
• Win-win Negotiations (or bargaining)
• Principled Negotiations
• Integrated Bargaining
• Mutual Gains Bargaining
• Collaborative Bargaining
WHAT IS IT?
• It is a relationship, more than a technique
• It is a relationship built on mutual trust
• It focuses on mutual problem solving, rather than “winning”
• A negotiating technique that requires firm commitment to four principles.
• It is the opposite of adversarial or positional bargaining
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES
1. Attack the issue, not the people
2. Focus on interests, not positions
3. Invent options for mutual gain
4. Evaluate options by agreed-upon criteria
ASSUMPTIONS
• The parties value a long-term relationship more than short-term gains.
• The parties can learn to trust each other.
• The parties are willing and able to help each other in solving problems and
satisfy each other’s needs and interests.
• Principles and standards can replace power in the bargaining process.
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STEPS TO FOLLOW
• To sell interest-based bargaining to the other side and your own
constituency, union and management agree that either side may pull out of
the experiment without adverse consequences during the fist three to five
negotiating sessions and return to the previous relationship.
• Communicate to your own constituencies your intentions to engage in
interest-based labor negotiations. Point out that this is only an experiment -
- that either party may pull out of the program without adverse
consequences if it does not work out.
• Gain support from all levels in your organization. During negotiations, take
time out periodically to communicate with your constituency to keep them
informed and maintain their trust in what you are doing.
• Both union and management carefully select representatives to serve on its
negotiating team.
• Jointly train members of the union and management negotiating teams in
the philosophy and techniques of interest-based bargaining, preferably by
an outside consultant.
• Prepare for negotiations. Really do your homework.
• If possible, let the consultant who trained the negotiating teams facilitate
the first two or three negotiating sessions.
• Both union and management negotiating teams prepare an opening
statement for the first negotiating session.
• At the first negotiating session discuss and agree on ground rules to follow
during sessions. One such ground rule should be the “Rule of One,”
meaning only one person is allowed to talk at any one time. Side
conversations and interruptions of the person who has the floor are not
allowed.
• Identify the issues that each side is concerned with.
• Reach agreement on the sequence of issues to be discussed.
• For each issue, openly discuss each side’s interests (real issues) behind the
issue.
• For each issue, develop options for mutual gain (preferably through
brainstorming techniques).
• For each issue, develop standards or criteria for evaluating the options that
have been generated.
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• Evaluate the options, sticking closely to the standards or criteria agreed
upon.
• Reach agreement.
• Write up the agreement.
DO’S AND DON’TS
DO’S
• Make sure you have the full support and participation of the top leadership
of both the union and management organization before you consider
interest-based bargaining.
• Use an outside consultant to get started.
• Make sure the union and management negotiating teams are properly
trained before you venture into interest-based bargaining.
• Start interest-based negotiations with the easy issues first and leave the
tough ones until later. Success in reaching agreement on the easy issues
builds confidence in the process and trust in each other.
• Just in case, have a “walk-away” alternative on the issues that are a matter
of survival.
• Listen -- really listen.
• Manage your perceptions. Don’t jump to conclusions.
• Remain unconditionally constructive, no matter what.
• Remember that you have be trustworthy before you can expect to be
trusted.
• Commit yourself to the process of interest-based bargaining. You will need
that commitment when the going gets rough.
• Do realize that people’s real interests in an issue are not always obvious,
not even to themselves. You my have to ask “why?” several times.
• Search for overlapping interests which both union and management share.
• Do expect serious differences of interest and serious controversy on the
tougher issues.
• Do expect failures, but they need not ruin the relationship.
• Treat everybody at the bargaining table as an equal.
• Realize that the negotiators at the bargaining table negotiate on behalf of
constituencies, usually multiple constituencies. You must help the other
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negotiators in their efforts to keep their own constituencies satisfied.
• Remember that consensus means that you feel you can live with a given
option. It need not be your favorite one.
• Walk the Talk. People judge you more by your actions than your words.
• Recognize that it is in management’s own interest to help strengthen union
security. Recognize that there are always competing factions within the
union that may try to undermine the union leadership’s efforts to cooperate
with management. Remember, union leaders are elected, not appointed.
• If necessary, form subcommittees to study issues that take a long time to
resolve or require special expertise. Have the subcommittee report back to
the main negotiating committee with its findings and recommendations.
Make sure the subcommittee is staffed with an equal number of union and
management representatives.
• When the other side behaves objectionably, take time out to negotiate or re-
negotiate the ground rules.
• Maintain accurate minutes on subject matters discussed at the previous
meeting -- those that have been completed or resolved, as well as those still
open. Remember that the average person forgets within 48 hours about 75
percent of what he or she has heard.
• Prepare and distribute an agenda before each meeting, so that the parties
can prepare themselves and do their homework.
• Seek the help of a federal, state, or private mediator when it looks like you
are going to reach an impasse during negotiations.
Don’ts
• Don’t expect too much too soon. Organizational cultures change slowly.
• Don’t expect to be trusted unless you are trustworthy yourself.
• Don’t have union representatives sit at one side of the table with
management people at the opposite side. Use mixed seating arrangements.
Use round tables, if possible.
• When you feel personally attacked, don’t counter-attack. It only escalates
the conflict, detracts from the issue, and does not solve problems. Remain
unconditionally constructive at all times.
• Don’t try interest-based bargaining until everybody involved has been
trained in the process.
• Don’t tackle the tough issues first. Start with the easy ones.
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• Don’t use power plays or intimidation to get what you want.
• Don’t undermine union security.
• Don’t allow meetings to become gripe sessions.
RULES FOR BRAINSTORMING
• In the first step, the goal is quantity, not quality, of ideas. The more ideas
the better.
• In the first step, any kind of evaluation or criticism of any idea or option is
strictly forbidden. Respect all ideas, no matter what.
• Use a free-wheeling imagination. Don’t get boxed in by conformity or fear
of disapproval. Pretend for the moment there are no limits on cost, time,
personnel, equipment, materials or other resources. (That comes later).
• Avoid “killer phrases,” like, “That’s ridiculous,” “We already tried that,”
or “Whoever heard of that?”
• Listen, really listen, to the ideas others come up with. Build on them
(piggyback) and come up with a fresh idea of your own; perhaps combine
ideas.
• Record each idea, preferably on a flip chart. It helps people piggyback and
affords equal recognition for everyone’s idea.
• Encourage participation by everybody in the room.
• When everybody has been working hard and no more new ideas are being
generated, agree on standards or criteria by which the ideas on the flip chart
are to be evaluated. Keep in mind the issue or problem to be solved.
• Next, quickly eliminate (strike out) those ideas that do not meet the agreed-
upon criteria for evaluation.
• Write down on a separate sheet of flip chart paper those ideas that survived.
• Have participants agree on a rank order of the remaining ideas in terms of
how well each meets the evaluation criteria.
• Reach consensus as to which idea best satisfies all of the evaluation
criteria.
• Consensus means you feel you can “live with” a certain decision. It doesn’t
have to be your ideal.
• Vote only as a last resort.
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POST-NEGOTIATION RITUALS
• Shake hands with everybody in the room.
• Congratulate each other for having reached an agreement peacefully.
• Remember -- in interest-based bargaining we do not celebrate victories --
but rather success in mutual problem solving.
• Emphasize that the other side bargained tough but fair. No negotiator likes
the image of as a pushover.
• Make only joint statements to the press about the success of the
negotiations.
• Make sure every member of the union and management negotiation team
gets his or her signature on the printed collective bargaining agreement.
• Make sure that the members of the negotiating team are the first to get a
copy of the printed collective bargaining agreement.
• The top leadership of the union and management organization should
publicly recognize the achievements of the negotiating committee.
• Remember that all of these rituals set the stage for the next contract
negotiation.
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APPENDIXB
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE GUIDELINES
(Note: Many of the items mentioned in Appendix A also apply to the guide for
LMCs in this Appendix)
OTHER NAMES FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
• Join-Labor-Management Committee (JLMC)
• Labor-Management Partnership Committee (LMPC)
• Labor-Management Problem-solving Team
• Quality Circle (if it includes union representatives)
• Total Quality Management or TQM (if it includes union representatives)
WHAT IS IT?
• A team of employees, selected by both union and management, who are
empowered to study and solve organizational problems.
• The degree of employee empowerment varies from organization to
organization and from team to team, all the way from being closely
directed to completely self-directed problem solving teams.
• All of the principles of team building, teamwork, employee participation
and employee empowerment apply to LMCs.
• LMCs usually exist separately from collective bargaining teams, but may
tackle problems referred to them by the union-management negotiating
team.
• LMCs may be formed before, after, or concurrently with interest based
bargaining.
ASSUMPTIONS
• Employees at all levels of the organization, if properly trained and
empowered, are capable of solving problems in a way that benefits both the
organization and other employees.
• Employees who are closest to the job are best qualified to solve job-related
problems.
• If the union is afforded full participation and equal control of LMCs, it can
and will become a process of effective mutual problem solving.
• The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. A successful system of
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Labor-Management Committees renders far greater outcomes than finding
solutions to a finite number of problems. It changes the whole
organizational culture for the better, in both employer and union
organization.
GETTING STARTED
• Make sure you have the support of all levels of the union and management
organization.
• Both union and management each carefully select representatives to serve
on the LMC(s).
• Jointly train union and management members on the LMC in the
philosophy of LMC, communication, team building, and problem solving
skills, plus any technical skills they may need. Do so before they actually
work as a problem solving team.
• The size of an LMC differs from organization to organization, depending
on the size and structure of the organization. It is essential, however, that
there be an equal number of union and management representatives on
each team.
• At the first LMC meeting, discuss and agree on ground rules to be observed
in each meeting. One such ground rule should be the “Rule of One,”
meaning only one person is allowed to talk at any one time. Side
conversations and interruptions of the person who has the floor are not
allowed.
• Clarify at the first meeting what the mission and objectives of this
particular LMC are.
• Reach agreement on the sequence of issues or problems to be discussed.
RULES FOR BRAINSTORMING
• In the initial stages of brainstorming, the goal is quantity not quality, of
ideas. The more ideas the better.
• In the first step, any kind of evaluation or criticism of any idea or option is
strictly forbidden. Respect all ideas, no matter what.
• Use a free-wheeling imagination. Don’t get boxed in by conformity or fear
of disapproval. Pretend for the moment that there are no limits on cost,
time, personnel, equipment, materials or other resources. (That comes
later.)
• Avoid “killer phrases” like, “That’s ridiculous,” “We already tried that,” or
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“Whoever heard of that?”
• Listen, really listen, to the ideas that others come up with. Build on them
(piggyback) and come up with a fresh idea of your own. Perhaps combine
ideas.
• Record each idea, preferably on a flip chart. It helps people piggyback and
affords equal recognition for each individual idea.
• Encourage participation by everybody in the room.
• When everybody has been heard and no more new ideas are being
generated, agree on standards or criteria by which the ideas on the flip chart
are to be evaluated. Keep in mind the issue or problem to be solved.
• Next, quickly eliminate (strike out) those ideas that do not meet the agreed-
upon criteria for evaluation.
• Write down on a separate sheet of flip chart paper those ideas that survived.
• Have participants agree on a rank order of the remaining ideas in terms of
how well each meets the evaluation criteria.
• Reach consensus as to which idea best satisfies all of the evaluation
criteria.
• Consensus means you feel you can live with a certain decision. It doesn’t
have to be your ideal.
• Vote only as a last resort.
DOS AND DON’TS
Dos
• Make sure you have the full support and participation of the top leadership
of both the union and management organization before you consider
interest-based bargaining.
• Use an outside consultant to get started.
• Make sure the teams are properly trained before they venture into actual
problem solving.
• Start with the easy issues first, and leave the tough ones until later. Success
in reaching agreement on the easy issues builds confidence in the process
and trust in each other.
• Everyone on the LMC is completely equal to everyone else, in the most
literal sense of the word.
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• Rotate the chairperson at every meeting. Everybody gets to be chairperson
in that rotation.
• The chairperson acts as a facilitator not as a leader.
• All issues and problems are to be resolved by consensus.
• Remember that consensus means that you feel you can live with a given
option. It need not be your favorite one.
• Make sure that no employee loses his or her job as a result of any LMC
activity.
• Make sure that each problem is precisely identified as to what, where,
when, how, and how much, before anyone is allowed to suggest a solution.
• Remain unconditionally constructive, no matter what.
• Remember that you have to be trustworthy before you can expect to be
trusted.
• Do expect serious differences of opinion and serious controversy on the
tougher issues.
• Do expect failures, but they need not ruin the LMC.
• When the other side behaves objectionably, take time out to negotiate or re-
negotiate the ground rules.
• Maintain accurate minutes on subject matters discussed at the previous
meeting, those that have been completed or resolved as well as those still
open. Remember that the average person forgets within 48 hours about 75
percent what he or she has heard.
• Prepare and distribute an agenda before each meeting, so that members can
prepare themselves and do their homework.
• At the first meeting, discuss and agree on ground rules to follow during
sessions. One such ground rule should be the “Rule of One,” meaning only
one person is allowed to talk at any one time. Side conversations and
interruptions of the person who has the floor are not allowed.
• Make sure that all of the LMC members participate in each meeting.
• Establish how often the LMC shall meet, and what the maximum duration
of any one meeting shall be.
• Stick to the agenda.
• Let bygones be bygones.
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• Speak for yourself at all times. Avoid “Your” language as much as
possible. For example:
“This is what I heard you say.”
“This is how I see it.”
“Here is how I feel about it.”
“Here is what I would like to see us do.”
• Form temporary subcommittees when the workload gets too heavy, a task
is too time consuming, or a problem requires special expertise. Consider
forming more LMCs.
• Consider hiring a third-party facilitator or external consultant when the
LMC gets stuck.
Don’ts
• Don’t have union representatives sit at one side of the table and
management representatives at the opposite side. Use mixed seating
arrangements. Use round tables, if possible.
• Don’t work on issues that are subject to collective bargaining, unless the
union and management negotiating teams have specifically delegated this
task to your committee.
• Don’t work on issues that are pending grievances. Allow the formal
grievance steps to run their course.
• Don’t expect too much too soon. Organizational cultures change slowly.
• Don’t start problem solving meetings until everybody has been trained in
the process.
• Don’t tackle the tough issues first. Start with the easy ones.
• Don’t jump to conclusions about the cause of a problem or what the
solution should be. Don’t fail to inform yourself first about what exactly
the problem is, where it is, when it is, how it manifests itself, and what the
extent of it is.
• Don’t attack the people, attack the problem. Don’t criticize the person,
criticize the idea. Make it an “it,” not a “you.”
• Don’t talk when you should be listening.
• Don’t mumble under your breath or to a neighbor. Say it out loud.
• Don’t interrupt the person who is speaking. Raise your hand to be
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recognized by the facilitator.
• No conspiracies or “coalitions” outside the meeting.
• Don’t undermine team decisions when talking to others in the organization.
Defend them to others in the organization.
• When you feel personally attacked, don’t counter-attack. It only escalates
the conflict, detracts from the issue, and does not solve problems. Remain
unconditionally constructive at all times.
• Don’t use power plays or intimidation to get what you want.
• Don’t undermine union security.
• Don’t undermine the collective bargaining agreement. Do not make any
decisions or recommendations that go against any provision in the
collective bargaining agreement
• Don’t allow meetings to become gripe sessions.
SUGGESTED MEETING EVALUATION FORM
Directions: Please reflect on the last LMC meeting you attended. After each
statement below, write in the number that best reflects your viewpoint on each
statement.
1=Strongly Disagree
2=Disagree
3=Undecided
4=Agree
5=Strongly Agree
Statement Rating
I knew why we were having the meeting before I arrived.
I knew what results we should accomplish at the meeting
before I arrived
Everyone who should have been at the meeting had been
told it was being held.
I received the agenda for the meeting beforehand
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COMMENTS: _________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Before I came to the meeting, I knew how it would be
conducted
There was enough time to discuss the agenda items
Everybody in the room participated
Everybody treated everybody else with respect
I felt everybody was listening when I spoke
We stuck to the agenda
We accomplished what we set out to accomplish
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APPENDIXC
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROCEDURES
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
One of the most severe constraints upon transit facilities is legally mandated
drug and alcohol testing of employees in safety-sensitive positions. These
constraints have far reaching effects on labor relations in transit. They are a
headache for both union and management. Ed Wytkind, Executive Director of
the Transportation Trades Department of the AFL-CIO said:
Drug and alcohol testing is another concern. The Teamsters and the
ATU and the TWU and others know all too well that there’s not a
day in a week when one of their members isn’t subjected to some
form of drug testing. Post-accident, pre-employment, return to
service, random––I don’t care what is. For the transit industry, it
was an unfunded mandate because it cost a lot of money and the
federal government didn’t finance it, so the public transit systems
have to pay for it.105
For union officers, supervisors and managers in the transit industry who deal
with employees in safety sensitive positions it is important to be familiar with
the government’s requirements of drug and alcohol testing.
The Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 requires drug and
alcohol testing not only in transit but other transportation industries as well.
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has published detailed rules
that require employers in the transportation industry to have certain programs
in place that control drug and alcohol abuse. These rules include required
procedures for urine drug testing and breath alcohol testing.
GRIEVANCES INVOLVING DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
Transit employees in safety-sensitive positions frequently file grievances over
disciplinary action taken against them because they allegedly refused to take a
drug or alcohol test, allegedly failed one of these tests, or other reasons.
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s regulations, if an
employee tampers with his urine sample during a drug test, he is automatically
considered to have “refused to submit to testing.” The price he or she pays is
105 Ed Wytkind, in Toward a Cooperative Future? Symposium. Norman Mineta International
Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, IISTPS Report 97-2, May 1997, p.68
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often termination. Frequently, however, the evidence is not quite so clear as to
whether the employee “really” refused to submit to the test, and the employer
runs the risk of having the discipline reversed by an arbitrator.
In the city of Yonkers, New York, for example, a driver was asked in the wake
of a vehicular accident to submit to a drug test. He did. But the drug-testing
laboratory reported to the employer that he had tampered with his urine sample
and failed the post-accident drug test. The employer concluded that the driver
had refused to submit to a post-accident drug test and terminated him. An
arbitrator ruled that the employee was not disciplined for just cause and a
greatly embarrassed employer had to reinstate the employee with back wages.
During the arbitration hearing it was revealed that when the employee went to
the drug testing facility, he simply did not produce a large enough urine sample
to satisfy the laboratory. The technician who administered the test threw that
sample away and asked the employee to produce another sample. It was
inadequate in volume as well. By the time he was asked to give a third sample,
he was so nervous that he could not urinate at all. The lab reported that he
refused to submit to a drug test and therefore failed the test.106
The Yonkers case and numerous other arbitration cases suggest that it is
extremely important for a transit employer to choose a competent and
reputable drug and alcohol testing service. Even then, the employer must
conduct a full and fair investigation that goes beyond a slip of paper from the
drug testing service that says the employee failed a test, refused to take it, or
tampered with the test sample. Conducting a full and fair investigation of drug
and alcohol related offenses requires a knowledge of the legal requirements of
drug and alcohol testing in the transit environment. The same is true for union
officers who want to successfully defend a transit employee in a drug or
alcohol-related disciplinary action.
ALCOHOL TESTING
Since alcohol is a legal substance, certain rules had to be created which limit
the use of alcohol for employees in safety-sensitive positions. Safety-sensitive
employees may not refuse to submit to an alcohol test. If such an employee
was involved in a traffic accident, he or she may not consume alcohol within
eight hours after an accident––whether at home, on the job, or elsewhere.
Alcohol testing for transit employees in safety-sensitive positions may take
place at four different occasions:
106 American Arbitration Association, Labor Arbitration in Government, Vol. 29, No. 7, July
1999, Case#5547.
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Post-accident testing
Reasonable suspicion testing
Random testing
Return to duty and follow-up testing
Post-accident alcohol testing is required for drivers whose performance could
have contributed to an accident (as determined by a citation for a moving
traffic violation). Alcohol testing is required in all accidents where there was a
fatality, even if the driver was not cited for a moving traffic violation.
There also has to be an alcohol breath test where there is reasonable suspicion
that a transit employee may be under the influence of alcohol during work
hours. When a trained supervisor or company official observes behavior or
appearance that is characteristic of alcohol misuse, an alcohol test is to be
conducted.
There also has to be random testing of transit employees in safety-sensitive
positions. That is to say, employees to be tested must be randomly selected, the
test must be unannounced, and must be conducted just before, during, or just
after performance of safety-sensitive functions. The testing dates and times are
unannounced and are conducted with unpredictable frequency throughout the
year. Each year the number of random tests conducted by the employer must
equal at least 25 percent of all the safety-sensitive drivers.
Return-to-duty and follow-up testing must take place when an individual
who has violated the prohibited alcohol conduct standards returns to
performing safety-sensitive duties. Follow-up tests are also unannounced, and
at least six tests must be conducted in the first 12 months after a driver returns
to duty. Follow-up testing may be extended for up to 60 months following
return to duty.
What are the consequences of alcohol misuse? Drivers who engage in
prohibited alcohol consumption must be immediately removed from safety-
sensitive functions. Drivers who have engaged in alcohol misuse cannot return
to safety-sensitive duties until they have been evaluated by a substance abuse
professional and complied with any treatment recommendations to assist them
with an alcohol problem. To further safeguard the public, drivers who have an
alcohol concentration of 0.02 or greater when tested just before, during, or just
after performing safety-sensitive functions must also be removed from
performing such duties for 24 hours. If a driver's behavior or appearance
suggests alcohol misuse, a reasonable suspicion alcohol test must be
conducted. If a breath test cannot be administered, the driver must be removed
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from performing safety-sensitive duties for at least 24 hours.
Are employees with alcohol problems entitled to rehabilitation? Drivers who
violate the alcohol misuse rules will be referred to a substance abuse
professional for evaluation. Any treatment or rehabilitation would be provided
in accordance with the employer's policy or collective bargaining agreements.
Employers are not required to provide rehabilitation themselves, pay for
treatment, or reinstate the driver in his or her safety-sensitive position. Any
employer who does decide to return a driver to safety-sensitive duties must
ensure that the driver has been evaluated by a substance abuse professional;
has complied with any recommended treatment; has taken a return-to-duty
alcohol test (with a result of less than 0.02 concentration); and is subject to
unannounced follow-up alcohol tests.
Are driver-alcohol testing records confidential? Yes. Test results and other
confidential information may be released only to the employer and the
substance abuse professional. Any other release of this information is only
with the driver's written consent. If a driver initiates a grievance, hearing,
lawsuit, or other action as a result of a violation of these rules, the employer
may release relevant information to the appropriate decision maker.
DRUG TESTING
Government drug testing rules are similar to alcohol testing rules, with a few
additional requirements. The drug testing rules cover the same drivers as the
alcohol testing rules. As far as timing and occasions are concerned, there is one
more type: Pre-employment drug testing. The five types of government
required drug tests are:
Pre-employment drug tests
Post-accident testing
Reasonable suspicion testing
Random testing
Return to duty and follow-up testing
The pre-employment drug test category, which covers applicants for safety-
sensitive positions, is self-explanatory. The other categories have already been
explained in our discussion on alcohol testing.
How is drug testing done? It is conducted by analyzing a driver's urine
specimen. The analysis has to be performed at a laboratory certified and
monitored by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). There
are about 90 DHHS certified drug-testing laboratories located throughout the
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United States. The driver provides a urine specimen in a location that affords
privacy. A so-called "collector" picks up, seals and labels the specimen, and
completes a chain of custody document. The collector then takes the specimen
and accompanying paperwork ready for shipment to a certified drug-testing
laboratory. The specimen collection procedures and chain of custody
document preparation ensure that the specimen's security, proper
identification, and integrity are not compromised. The law requires that drug-
testing procedures for commercial motor vehicle drivers include split specimen
procedures. Each urine specimen is subdivided into two bottles labeled as a
"primary" and a "split" specimen. Both bottles are sent to a laboratory. Only
the primary specimen is opened and used for the urinalysis. The split specimen
bottle remains sealed and is stored at the laboratory. If the analysis of the
primary specimen confirms the presence of illegal, controlled substances, the
driver has 72 hours to request the split specimen be sent to another DHHS-
certified laboratory for analysis. This split specimen procedure essentially
provides the driver with an opportunity for a "second opinion."
What drugs are transit employees or applicants tested for? All urine specimens
are analyzed for the following:
Marijuana (THC metabolite)
Cocaine
Amphetamines
Opiates (including heroin)
Phencyclidine (PCP)
Drug testing is done in two stages. First, a regular drug test is performed. If the
result is positive for one or more of the drugs listed above, then a confirmation
test is performed for each identified drug, using state-of-the-art gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) analysis. GC/MS confirmation
ensures that over-the-counter medications or preparations are not reported as
positive results.
Who reviews and interprets the laboratory results? All drug test results are
reviewed and interpreted by a physician called a Medical Review Officer
(MRO) before the results are reported to the employer. If the laboratory reports
a positive result to the MRO, the MRO contacts the driver (in person or by
telephone) and conducts an interview to determine if there is an alternative
medical explanation for the drugs found in the driver's urine specimen. For all
the drugs except PCP, there are some special, legitimate medical uses that may
explain the positive test result. If the driver provides appropriate
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documentation, and the MRO determines that it is legitimate medical use of the
prohibited drug, the drug test result is reported to the employer as negative.
What are the consequences of a positive (failed) drug test? A driver must be
removed from safety-sensitive duty if he or she has a positive drug test result.
The removal cannot take place until the MRO has interviewed the driver and
determined that the positive drug test resulted from the unauthorized use of a
controlled substance. A driver cannot be returned to safety-sensitive duties
until he or she has been evaluated by a substance abuse professional or MRO,
has complied with recommended rehabilitation, and has a negative result on a
return-to-duty drug test. Follow-up testing to monitor the driver's continued
abstinence from drug use may be required.
How does random drug testing work? The prescribed procedure is similar to
the requirements of random alcohol tests, as described above, except that the
total number of random drug tests conducted each year must equal at least 50
percent of the safety-sensitive drivers. Random testing for drugs does not have
to be conducted in immediate time proximity to performing safety-sensitive
functions. Once notified of the selection for testing, however, a driver must
proceed to a collection site to undergo the urine specimen test.
What about employee drug education and training? Employers must provide
information on drug use and treatment resources to safety-sensitive drivers. All
supervisors and managers of safety-sensitive drivers must attend at least one
hour of training on the signs and symptoms of drug abuse. This training is
regarded to be necessary to determine when reasonable suspicion exists.
Are driver drug testing records confidential? Yes! Driver drug testing results
and records are to be kept strictly confidential by the employer, by the drug
testing laboratory, and by the medical review officer. They cannot be released
to others without the written consent of the driver. As in alcohol testing,
exceptions to these confidentiality provisions are limited to a decision maker in
arbitration, litigation or administrative proceedings arising from a positive
drug test result. Statistical records and reports are maintained by employers
and drug-testing laboratories. These data are used mainly to monitor
compliance with the rules and to assess the effectiveness of drug education
programs.
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